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CHAPTER I 
 
PRICE DISCOVERY FROM PEERS: PEER LIQUIDITY AND OWN 
VOLATILITY 
 
I. Introduction 
According to French and Roll (1986), two sources of market volatility are 
information and the error in estimating the information’s value (“pricing error”). Pricing 
error arises from the difference between the current stock price and the true stock price, 
where the true stock price reflects all available public information. Every announcement 
generates pricing error because there is no accurate way to convert qualitative 
information into quantitative price level. Information can be differently interpreted by 
traders. Trading is actually a process to resolve differences of opinion. For example, 
Harris and Raviv (1993) model how differences in opinion create trading volume. 
Without differences of opinion, there will be no trade at all, because stock price would 
instantly reach true value, and additional trading would only incur transaction cost. 
Pricing error has not been regarded as an important factor in investment decisions, 
because the resulting volatility seemed to be small and short lived.1
                                                 
1 The literature on differences of opinion is related to pricing error, because it studies a temporary 
deviation of stock price from true price. Miller (1977) shows stock price can be overvalued if there is short 
sales constraint. Hong and Stein (2003) and Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) argue differences of 
opinion can make stock prices to deviate from true value. Differences of opinion after a public information 
arrival is studied in Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994). These papers do not 
exclusively deal with pricing error, but they show that differences of opinion can generate some particular 
patterns in stock price and volume. Pricing error is also related to price discovery models such as Kyle 
(1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1992). However, price discovery models focus on private information, and 
assume there are two types of investors – informed and liquidity traders. These settings are inappropriate to 
be applied to pricing error, because pricing error stems from public information. 
 However, recent 
 
 2 
findings show that pricing error is a significant portion of overall stock volatility (Evans 
and Lyons 2008), and pricing error can have substantial effect on traders in today’s 
market environment. 
While many institutions develop and use mechanical trading strategies, a higher 
pricing error means that a major input to the trading equation – stock price – includes 
significant amount of error. Let’s say bad news arrives and stock price drops 12% 
instantly. A program trading department of an investment bank sells its entire holdings 
because their model require a ‘stop loss’, when the price drops more than 10%. After a 
few hours, investors determine the news cannot have such large effect for the stock and 
price recovers to 5% drop. The bank mistakenly sold their position at a lower price due to 
pricing error. Even long term traders are exposed to pricing error, because they need to 
choose when and how to place their orders. While we often use market closing price to 
value a stock, actual orders can be executed in different trading hours, and exposure to 
pricing error can depend on order execution strategy. For example, order placements at 
market open is subject to larger pricing error, as documented in Amihud and Mendelson 
(1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990). Pricing error is also of interest to traders who want 
to read inside information from price movements. Volatility created by pricing error can 
make it difficult to interpret stock prices. Research into the determinants of pricing error 
would be valuable. 
This paper examine whether pricing error in a stock can be affected by the trading 
activities of other stocks. If public information affects multiple stocks, investors can filter 
out pricing error by consulting the prices of other stocks.2
                                                 
2 Veldkamp (2006) shows investors prefer information that can be applied to multiple assets, and such 
behavior generates comovement of asset prices. Chan (1993) argues market makers consult multiple stock 
 The stocks that share the same 
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set of public information can be called as ‘peer stocks’. Earnings news from GM, for 
example, can affect the stock prices of Ford or Chrysler. When the effect of information 
is not restricted to one stock, investors can reduce a stock’s pricing error by consulting 
the prices of peer stocks. Suppose there is bad news for automobile industry during non-
trading hours. At the next day’s market opening, Ford stock goes down 10% while GM 
stock goes down 2%. Such differences can occur since no investor can make perfectly 
accurate assessment about the impact of a new piece of information for a stock’s price. 
Assuming information has a similar effect on Ford and GM, the true value of the bad 
news will be closer to the average of two price movements. Hence, two stocks will mean-
revert to minus 6% at the following trade. While Ford and GM stocks record their 
opening prices, Chrysler stock did not trade yet.3
The model has several implications. First, individual pricing error is a decreasing 
function of peer stock trading activity. Investors learn the value of information from peer 
stock prices and reduce their own stock’s pricing error.
 Traders of Chrysler can learn that true 
value of the information is near minus 6%, and adjust their trading activities based on 
these priors. GM, and Ford stocks exhibit more volatility compared to Chrysler, because 
they traded earlier. Based on this intuition, I construct a model on pricing error and the 
effect of peer stocks. 
4
                                                                                                                                                 
prices to reduce pricing error of their own stock. Pasquariello and Vega (2008) argue informed traders 
place strategic orders on other stocks to camouflage their trading in one stock. Accounting papers including 
Han and Wild (1990) and Clinch and Sinclair (1987) find that one firm’s earnings information has an effect 
on other stocks’ prices. In the international finance literature, studies such as Karolyi and Stulz (2003), 
show that the information transfers can also occur across markets in different nations. 
 This process is like using a 
3 Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) argue stocks have different 
adjustment speed to market wide information. During 1997 ~ 2002 in NASDAQ, the stocks do not open 
simultaneously on 9:30 am. Most stocks have several minutes between market opening and the time of the 
first trade. 
4 Chan (1993) has a model that market makers consult other stock prices to lower the pricing error of their 
own stock price. 
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sample mean to estimate the value of the population mean, where estimation error 
(pricing error) decreases in the sample size (number of peer stock prices). Second, the 
liquidity of peer stocks is beneficial. If a stock has many liquid stocks as its peers, 
investors have more opportunity to learn, because there are a larger price data of peer 
stocks. A stock may have a smaller pricing error even without own trading. Third, the 
model implies that late trading stocks have less pricing error than fast trading stocks. This 
is because the traders of late trading stocks can learn from prices of fast trading stocks 
and reduce pricing error. As a result, the first reactions of fast trading stocks contain more 
pricing error than those of late trading stocks. A lower liquidity does not necessarily 
mean a higher pricing error. I test the model’s implications using NASDAQ opening 
prices. I find that stocks that have more learning opportunity from other stocks have a 
lower volatility, a smaller pricing error, and a weaker tendency to mean-revert. 
This paper contributes to the literature by identifying a relation between individual 
pricing error and the trading activities of multiple stocks. The result supplements a 
growing literature on the interaction of multiple trading activities such as Pasquariello 
and Vega (2008). It also sheds additional lights on the relation between individual 
liquidity and market liquidity. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that correlation 
between two liquidities can affect asset price. I provide a basis why such correlation 
should exist. Implications of the model can be applied to the selection of stock execution 
strategy or market design. For example, investors can use trading activities of other 
stocks to estimate pricing error in a stock price. They can incorporate this information 
when they choose their order execution strategy. A trading system can provide the 
information of multiple (and possibly international) stock prices to help decisions. In 
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market design, the model implies that partial trading halt is better than circuit breaker, 
because investors can consult the prices of other stocks and fix their once ‘irrational’ 
pricing. The model can also give additional insights in known empirical price patterns 
such as relation between trading hour and volatility. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and 
Stoll and Whaley (1990) document abnormally high volatility at market open compared 
to close. This puzzle is revisited by Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Forster and George 
(1996), Madhavan and Sofianos (1998), and Stoll (2000). This paper shows that the 
abnormal volatility at open is related to pricing error and learning effect. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes the model on pricing 
error after public information arrival. Section 3 tests the empirical hypotheses derived 
from the model. Section 4 concludes. 
 
II. Model of Pricing Error 
 
A. New Information and First Reaction 
The model starts with an assumption that one cannot perfectly assess the true value of 
new information for a stock’s price.5
                                                 
5 French and Roll (1986) is one of the early papers to make this assumption and Harris and Raviv (1993) 
construct a model on trading volume based on the assumption. 
 If investors can accurately assess its true value 
instantly, there should be no trading, because trading a stock creates no profit but incurs 
transaction costs. Assume that when public information is released, investors cannot 
accurately convert new information into price changes, but they can only make an 
estimate of the true value of the information. The setting is similar to Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994) who model trading activity after an earnings announcement or Chan (1993) who 
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model market makers consulting price data of other stocks. I write the estimated value of 
the new information event as: 
 ij
i
j vInfo η+=                                             (1) 
i
jInfo  is investor i’s estimated value of the information for stock j, v is the true value 
of information, and η is an independent, identically distributed error term with mean 
value 0 and variance σ2. The term η can be also thought of as a measure of investor 
differences of opinion. Note that v does not have a subscript j, because the value of 
information is assumed to be common to multiple stocks. I define peer stocks as the 
stocks that share the same information. 
Investors know their estimates Info includes error η, but they cannot observe v or η. 
This setting assumes investors’ ability to process information varies, but each investor 
cannot measure the size of her own estimation error. Each investor believes her estimate 
Info is an unbiased estimate of the true value v, so probability that the true value of the 
information is higher than her own estimate is 50%. If investors wait until the true value 
is revealed, their short term profit by trading the stock is negative, because they have to 
buy or sell at the correct price and pay a transaction cost. On the other hand, if they trade 
before the true value is revealed, there is a chance to get a better price than what they 
expected. For example, if an investor buys a stock sufficiently below her Info, her 
expected profit based on her own belief is: (Info – transaction price – transaction cost ≥ 
0). Hence, less risk-averse investors trade before the true value is revealed, and the 
number of those investors is proportional to the total number of investors in a stock. The 
size of the investor pool for a stock is given, and it varies across stocks. If one of those 
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risk taking investors wants to buy a stock, her bid quote will be her estimate Info minus 
transaction cost m that must be incurred: 
buyer
j
buyer
j
buyer
j
buyer
j
buyer
j mvmInfoBid −+=−= η                         (2) 
 
Similarly, her ask quote will be: 
seller
j
seller
j
seller
j
seller
j
seller
j mvmInfoAsk ++=+= η  
 
These quotes represent the maximum or minimum price an investor is willing to pay 
based on her own belief. Because η is a distribution, there can be a case when a buyer’s 
bid quote is higher than a seller’s ask quote. Then a trade occurs and price change is 
approximately 2/)( sellerj
buyer
jv ηη ++ , provided that the size of m is similar across investors 
who are trading the same stock. This price change contains error, because the estimation 
error η of the buyer and seller are not completely offset. We can rewrite the price change 
as the sum of the information’s value and an error term e, which is a linear function of η: 
 ji evP +=∆                                          (3) 
 
Because η is independent and identically distributed with zero mean, e is also 
independent, identically distributed with zero mean. The stock price changes have a 
common true value v and an individual error term e as illustrated in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Price change after industry wide information arrival (Multiple stock view). 
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B. Price Discovery from Peers 
If one investor knows the true information value v, she can buy undervalued stock 
and sell overvalued stock to earn arbitrage profit. By this arbitrage trading, the stock price 
change will eventually arrive at its true level v. This process is illustrated in figure 2. 
In the real world, it is impossible to know the true value v. The second best method 
for investors is to estimate the true value v from the price changes of its peer stocks. The 
cross referencing is possible because all stocks in the peer group are affected by the same 
information set. In statistical sense, it is like using the sample mean in place of true mean. 
Figure 3 shows the case when traders use the average price changes of two peer stocks. 
A strategy of selling the stock that moved higher than the peer stock average and 
buying the stock that moved lower than the average yields profits. This strategy yields a 
dynamic arbitrage, since a profit is guaranteed by the Law of Larger Numbers; the 
sample average converges to the population mean after a large number of trials. In this 
case, sample average corresponds to the average price changes of peers stocks, and 
population mean corresponds to the true value of an information event. 
 
Result 1: A stock’s price change after an information event’s arrival converges to the 
average price change of its peer stocks. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
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Figure 2. Arbitrage strategy when true value v is known. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Estimating true value from price changes. 
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The average of price change is closer to the true value v, but it still contains sampling 
error. Investors can update their beliefs after observing the average price, but due to the 
sampling error, there are still differences of opinion about the true value of information. 
So some investors still trade based on their updated beliefs. If there are many peer stocks 
with trading, investors can extract the true value with higher accuracy, because the 
standard error of the estimate is a decreasing function of sample size.6
 
 This process 
continues until sufficient amount of trade data is accumulated and differences of opinion 
become small. 
Result 2: A stock’s price change after the information arrival becomes more accurate, 
the larger is the sample of previously traded peer stocks. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Result 2 shows that other things equal, a stock that does not have previous prices to 
consult will have larger error in its price changes. This result explains why market 
opening prices should have larger pricing error compared to closing prices. (Stoll (2000) 
calls this phenomenon as ‘opening friction’.) Compare market opening price to the prices 
of other trading hours. At other trading hours, investors have continuous price change 
information of peer stocks as well as its own stock. At the market open, however, all 
stocks have not traded for hours.7
                                                 
6 Note that the cross consulting cannot reduce any bias in the value of information. If all the peer stocks 
contain the same amount of bias in the value v, comparing with other prices would still yield a biased result. 
Learning from peers can even create a bubble, by replicating and confirming the bias in peer stocks. 
 Investors are forced to estimate the value of overnight 
7 Exceptions are stocks cross listed on exchanges that trades earlier. 
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information without the help of current peer stock prices. Opening price, therefore, has a 
higher variance compared to its prices at other hours of the trading day. The model not 
only explains the cause of the friction, but also predicts that stocks opening later than 
their peers would exhibit lower opening friction. 
The learning framework implies that a trading halt of a few stocks is more beneficial 
than a circuit breaker. A trading halt gives investors an opportunity to compare a stock’s 
price with the prices of other related stocks, and this can reduce its pricing error. The 
circuit breaker, on the other hand, does not reduce pricing error, because all the stocks in 
the market stop having price information. 
 
C. Liquidity, Peer Stocks, and Volatility 
Stocks do not always react to new information at the same time in actual trades. An 
example is opening prices. Most stocks open later than the official market opening time 
of 9:30 am. Stoll and Whaley (1990) document the average time elapse between the 
official opening of the exchange and the opening transaction in a stock was 15 minutes in 
1986 for NYSE stocks. Data from 1997 to 2002 shows the average opening delay is about 
6 minutes for NASDAQ stocks.8
Assume investors arrive sequentially to the market after a public announcement. 
Every short period of time s, one investor arrives at the market. s is decreasing in the size 
of the investor pool in a stock, so a stock with a larger investor pool has a higher arrival 
rate. An investor has one bid quote and one ask quote based on her belief. Her belief Info 
is based on a random draw from the distribution of η. The variance σ2 is similar across 
 
                                                 
8 This number excludes outliers that open later than 30 minutes. 
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stocks. The probability of a transaction after time t is the probability that the highest bid 
quote is above the lowest ask quote: 
))min()Pr(max())min()Pr(max( sellerj
seller
j
buyer
j
buyer
j mvmvAskBid ++≥−+=≥ ηη  
               )0)min()Pr(max( ≥+−−= sellerj
seller
j
buyer
j
buyer
j mm ηη         (4) 
 
This probability is increasing in the number of quotes up to time t and the size of the 
estimation error σ2, while decreasing in the size of the transaction cost m. The number of 
quotes is decreasing in s, because a stock with a slower arrival rate will have fewer 
investors willing to trade in the stock. Define a liquid stock as a stock with a larger 
investor pool and lower transaction cost. Then a liquid stock has a higher probability of a 
transaction during a fixed amount of time t. If peer stocks are relatively more liquid, 
investors would have a larger price data to update their estimations. Other things equal, a 
stock’s pricing error is decreasing in the liquidity of peer stocks. 
To illustrate the point, consider three peer stocks, A, B and C. Stock A and B are 
traded more frequently than stock C (higher liquidity). New information hits the market 
and stock A and B have immediate transactions, because they have more liquidity. Now 
stock C trades a minute later. Traders of stock C can learn from the prior price changes of 
stocks A and B. Hence, stock C’s first price change after the information arrival can be 
more accurate, even if it did not have trading activity to resolve differences in opinion. 
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Figure 4. Price discovery process. 
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This analysis predicts price leadership by the more liquid stocks. When investors use 
peer stock prices to update their estimates, the average of the liquid stock transactions is 
an unbiased estimator of the true value. Hence, the average reaction of liquid stocks will 
lead the average reaction of illiquid stocks. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) and 
Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) empirically find such price leadership by liquid 
stocks. Note however, that the evidence of price leadership does not indicate that faster 
movers have always smaller pricing errors. 
The price discovery model gives testable predictions from the learning effect. From 
result 1, stock price changes should show mean-reversion to peer stocks’ average price 
change after new information arrival. From result 2, the error in the first reaction should 
be decreasing by the number of peer stocks’ trades. Also, one can infer from the results 
that the degree of mean-reversion is weaker when a stock has more learning opportunity. 
 
D. Scope of Peer Stocks 
Result 1 predicts that stocks will mean-revert to the cross sectional average. Note that 
this result is based on the unrealistic assumption that all peer stocks react to an 
information event in the same direction. If firms are highly competitive, for example, 
good news for one firm can be bad news for the other firms. I relax this assumption and 
discuss the scope of peer stocks in this section. 
Investors know a firm’s characteristics before trading its stock. (Leverage, cost 
structure, or industry organization, etc.) I introduce a variable c, which represents the 
sensitivity of a stock to information, based on known firm characteristics. The sensitivity 
c can be positive or negative. For simplicity, let the effect of information and pricing 
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error be proportional to the characteristic factor c. Then the price change of stock i is 
expressed as: )()( iiii evcccP +⋅==∆ . Similarly, the price change of a peer stock j is 
expressed as: )()( jjjj evcccP +⋅==∆ . Investors can take the sensitivity out and 
directly compare v+ei to v+ej, assuming they already know ci and cj. Investors of stock j 
can compare the price change of stock j to the price change of stock i by multiplying cj/ci. 
 
)()( iiii evcccP +⋅==∆  
)()( jjjj evcccP +⋅==∆  
)()]([)( ji
j
i
jjij evcc
cevcccP +⋅=×+⋅==∆                              (5) 
 
Now the investors can follow the procedures in the previous section to reduce the 
pricing error. The basic idea is that investors account for the cross sectional difference in 
sensitivities to information. For example, investors of airline industry stocks can be 
surprised at a sudden increase in crude oil price. Observing the stock prices of refining 
companies can give investors some idea of whether the price change is temporary or not.  
Investors do not compare raw returns, because the sensitivity of the airline stock prices to 
crude oil price differs from that of refining firms stock prices. In this case, c is the 
dependence of the airline industry and the refining industry on crude oil price. 
Any stock with pre-known characteristics can be useful for reducing the pricing error 
of other related stocks. Investors can use a large set of trade data to get better pricing of 
their own stock. Such trade data can include stock prices of major supplier industries, 
prices of derivatives, and prices of stocks on other exchanges. The range of peer stocks 
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should not be restricted to close competitors or firms in the same industry. A policy 
implication is that it is better to provide more price information to investors. In my 
empirical work, I use equal-weighted market average return as a benchmark of the peer 
stock movements.9
In the following section, I empirically test the results of the model using market 
opening prices. The market opening transaction is the first reaction to an overnight 
information arrival, and so I can test the model without the difficulty of identifying the 
information arrival time and the first reaction to it. I also test whether the model actually 
explains opening friction, documented by Amihud and Mendelson (1987), Stoll and 
Whaley (1990), and Stoll (2000). I analyze returns instead of price changes to compare 
with the earlier literature of opening friction. However, implications of the model are 
unchanged by using stock returns.
 This setting would tend to capture the effect of market wide public 
information, which will in general have a similar effect across stocks. In other words, the 
effect of different characteristic c will be somewhat neutralized at the market wide level. 
10
 
 
III. Empirical Tests 
 
A. Data 
The main data source of this study comes from the Financial Markets Research 
Center (FMRC) in Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University. 
FMRC has daily market microstructure database that is constructed from Trade and 
Quote (TAQ) data. The data covers all firms in TAQ except the stocks with daily prices 
                                                 
9 Since the model gives the same weight for all prices, I use equal weighted return. 
10 Switching between two measures is not rare. For example, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) models 
order imbalance using price changes, but use returns in empirical analysis. 
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below $3. Information in the database includes market microstructure variables such as 
time of the opening trade, bid-ask spread, dollar volume and price. I use daily data from 
January 1997 to July 2002 in this study, and from this point, I call this dataset the market 
microstructure (MMS) dataset. MMS dataset provides opening price, closing price and 
noon price. Opening price is the first traded price after official market opening (9:30 am). 
Closing price is the last traded price before official market closing. (4:00 pm) Noon price 
is the traded price closest to 12:00 pm. If a stock does not have more than 10 trades 
during a day, I drop that day’s observation. This filter makes sure I use the stocks with 
considerable trading activity, and reduces the problem of infrequent trading. Additionally, 
I control for stock splits and dividends by deleting the returns in the window [-1, +1] of 
the event date. I call an individual stock’s monthly variance based on open to open return 
as ‘opening variance’. The closing variance is based on close to close return. 
I use NASDAQ listed firms throughout the analysis.11
                                                 
11 MMS follows the TAQ’s categorization for major exchange. MMS uses all the transactions from the 
listed exchanges to define opening, closing and noon price. 
 NASDAQ data fits the 
model’s learning framework well for several reasons. The model is based on a continuous 
trading framework, and for my sample period, NASDAQ has a continuous trading 
process at opening. In contrast, NYSE has a call auction at opening. The second reason is 
related to diversification. NASDAQ has relatively homogeneous firms compared to the 
NYSE. Many firms are in high-tech industries that share the same information set, so it is 
easier to learn from peer stocks. The third reason is the short speed it takes to reflect 
overnight information. It will be hard to observe the learning effect if it happens over 
long periods of time. Masulis and Shivakumar (2002) show NASDAQ stocks reflect 
overnight seasoned equity offering announcement an hour faster than NYSE stocks. 
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B. Mean-reversion 
Since I analyze various stock returns around market opening, I define those stock 
returns first. Let the opening return be the return between two consecutive opening prices. 
I define the closing return be the return between two consecutive closing prices. The 
overnight return is the return between last day’s closing price and today’s opening price. 
The morning return is the return between today’s opening price and today’s noon price. 
The following figure shows the types of returns I use. 
The overnight return corresponds to the first price change to new information arrival 
in the model, because the overnight return is the first price movement after overnight 
information arrivals. Result 1 predicts that pricing errors should be reduced by using the 
movements of peer stocks. The simplest form of error correction process is mean-
reversion to the market average movement.12
 
 I check the morning return to see how 
much of the overnight return is reverted to the market average movement. I convert result 
1 to hypothesis 1 as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: A stock’s overnight return has a tendency to converge to the average 
return of the stocks at the following morning. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This statement assumes the sign of sensitivity c is similar. Market wide information would generate a 
similar sign of c across many stocks. 
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Figure 5. Types of returns. 
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The equation used to test the hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
morningovernight
i
overnight
i
morning rrrr ⋅+−⋅+= 1)( γλα                    (6) 
 imorningr  is the return between today’s first price and noon price 
 morningr  is the average of morning returns 
 iovernightr  is the return between previous day’s closing price and today’s 
opening price 
 overnightr  is the average of overnight returns 
 
To calculate the average overnight return for each day, I use the stocks that had first 
transaction in 1 minute after market open. These prices are the first reactions to overnight 
information without much learning effect. Under Hypothesis 1, if a stock has higher 
overnight return than average, its morning return should be lower. This prediction means 
the sign of coefficient λ should be negative. I estimate equation (6) for each stock, using 
all the time-series observations available, except cases when an opening price has a time 
stamp later than 10:00 am. Then I count the stocks with negative λs. 
Table 1 shows the stocks in general have negative λs. A simple sign test confirms the 
significant tendency of λs to be negative. There is cross-sectional mean-reversion to the 
peer stocks’ average. This result indicates there is considerable pricing error at market 
opening, and the error is reduced by converging to cross-sectional average. Substituting 
market-wide average of fast opening stocks with industry-wide average does not change 
the pattern. 
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Table 1 
Mean-reversion 
 
I run following regression for each stock every year and see the sign of lambda. 
 
Model: morningovernight
i
overnight
i
morning rrrr ⋅+−⋅+= 1)( γλα                         (6) 
 imorningr  is the return between today’s first price and noon price 
 morningr  is the average of morning returns 
 iovernightr  is the return between previous day’s closing price and today’s 
opening price 
 overnightr  is the average of overnight returns 
 
The average overnight return is calculated from the overnight returns of the stocks that opened in 
the first minute after market open. Stocks are classified by average market value. Percent values 
are in the parentheses. Sign test shows the probability to have one type of sign occurring over 
60% by chance is below 1%. Panel A shows the sum of all negative and positive coefficients, 
while panel B only uses coefficients significant in 5% level. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of negative and positive lambda signs 
 
All stocks Size (Min) Size (2) Size (3) Size (Max) 
Negative signs 1308 
(94.8%) 
335 
(97.1%) 
335 
(97.1%) 
333 
(96.5%) 
305 
(88.4%) 
Positive signs 72 
(5.2%) 
10 
(2.9%) 
10 
(2.9%) 
12 
(3.5%) 
40 
(11.6%) 
Total 1380 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
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Panel B: Number of significant lambda signs in 5% level 
 All stocks Size (Min) Size (2) Size (3) Size (Max) 
Negative signs 1115 
(80.8%) 
299 
(86.7%) 
297 
(86.1%) 
285 
(82.6%) 
234 
(67.8%) 
Positive signs 21 
(1.5%) 
4 
(1.1%) 
4 
(1.2%) 
1 
(0.3%) 
12 
(3.5%) 
Insignificant 244 
(17.7%) 
42 
(12.2%) 
44 
(12.7%) 
59 
(17.1%) 
99 
(28.7%) 
Total 1380 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
345 
(100%) 
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A limitation of the previous test is that it only counts the frequency of mean-reversion. 
In order to estimate the degree of mean-reversion, we need to compare how much of the 
overnight return is offset by the mean-reversion process. The degree of mean-reversion 
can be measured by the profit of an arbitrage trading strategy. The model predicts that 
investors can seek true value of information by buying the stocks that moved above 
average and selling the stocks that moved below average. Since it measures the 
differences between individual returns and average returns, the amount of profit acquired 
from the trading strategy will be similar to the amount of mean-reversion. 
To make the trading strategy feasible, the average overnight return of a day is 
calculated from the stocks that had opening transactions in the first minute after market 
open. Then, I assume an arbitrager starts buying or selling the stocks that had first 
transactions two minutes after market open.13
Table 2 presents the result of the trading. For the all years in my dataset, the arbitrage 
trading earns profits in the range of 0.4 ~ 1.3%, which can exceed transaction costs. The 
profit gets lower as we go to more recent years, indicating the pricing error is decreasing 
 This setting gives the arbitrager some time 
to digest and use the prior price data. According to the model, if a stock’s overnight 
return is above that day’s average overnight return, the stock is likely to have positive 
pricing error. An arbitrager sells those stocks and buys the ones that moved below 
average. She puts equal weight in two portfolios, and the stocks in each portfolio also 
have equal weights. The equal amount of buying and selling implies a zero investment 
strategy. The profit is measured by comparing the two portfolio’s morning return, which 
is the price change between opening price and noon price. I take the yearly average of the 
daily returns from this trading strategy. 
                                                 
13 The opening delay of a stock should be less than 30 minutes to be included in this analysis. 
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over time. Perhaps increased price information from other markets (such as international 
markets) and lower transaction cost for the arbitrage strategy have contributed to this 
phenomenon. The existence of arbitrage profits confirms that stocks overshoot or 
underreact to overnight information, and the pricing error is corrected by a subsequent 
mean-reversion process. 
The model predicts that pricing error will be small for slow moving stocks, so we can 
infer that the profit of the arbitrage trading (degree of mean-reversion) would be small for 
a stock that reacts later to an information event. I test whether this is the case for opening 
prices. I use a stock’s opening delay, which is the difference between the time of the first 
transaction and the official market opening, to measure the speed of a stock’s reaction to 
overnight information. Each day I rank the opening delay into quartiles, and calculate the 
average profit of the arbitrage trading by the quartiles. Panel A of table 3 shows the result. 
Although the relation is not completely monotonic, we can see the profit is the lowest in 
the latest opening quartile, indicating the stocks with the largest learning opportunity 
have the least degree of mean-reversion. Panel B of Table 3 classifies stocks first by 
market value quartiles and then the opening delay quartiles. This process gives 4x4 = 16 
clusters, and I calculate the profit of the arbitrage strategy by each cluster. Panel B of 
Table 3 shows that the profit of the arbitrage is decreasing in learning opportunity. The 
stocks with longer opening delay yields lower return in general. This result shows that the 
stocks with more learning opportunity have lower degree of mean-reversion. 
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Table 2 
An arbitrage trading strategy using mean-reversion 
 
I classify stocks into two categories using overnight returns. If overnight return is above that 
day’s average overnight return, I assume an investor sells those stocks. The investor buys the 
ones that moved below average. The average is calculated from the overnight returns of the 
stocks that opened in the first minute after market open. The investor trades the stocks that 
opened later than 2 minutes after market open. The investor puts equal weight to two portfolios, 
and the stocks in each portfolio also have equal weights. The equal amount of buying and selling 
gives a zero investment strategy. The profit is measured by comparing two portfolio’s morning 
return, which is the price change between opening price and noon price. I take yearly average of 
the daily return from the strategy in panel A. In Panel B, I take average of the daily return by 
quartiles of the time between market open and the first transaction. 
 
 
Panel A: Arbitrage return by year 
Year 
Above average 
portfolio return 
“Sell” 
(A) 
Below average 
portfolio return 
“Buy” 
(B) 
Trading 
Profit 
Buy – Sell 
(B – A) 
1997 -0.76% 0.53% 1.29% 
1998 -0.34% 0.74% 1.08% 
1999 -0.24% 0.59% 0.83% 
2000 -0.18% 0.61% 0.79% 
2001 -0.13% 0.25% 0.38% 
2002 -0.19% 0.20% 0.40% 
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Table 3 
Degree of mean-reversion and opening delay 
 
In panel A, I rank the opening delay of stocks into quartiles and report the profit of the arbitrage 
trading. In panel B I divide stocks by market value quartiles, and then each market value quartile 
is divided into opening delay quartiles. This process gives 4x4 = 16 clusters, and I measure the 
profit of the arbitrage strategy in each cluster. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Arbitrage return by opening delay 
Quartiles of 
opening delay 
Above average 
portfolio return 
“Sell” 
(A) 
Below average 
portfolio return 
“Buy” 
(B) 
Trading 
Profit 
Buy - Sell 
(B – A) 
1 (Fastest) -0.78% 0.31% 1.09% 
2 -0.97% 0.48% 1.45% 
3 -0.84% 0.36% 1.20% 
4 (Slowest) -0.36% 0.21% 0.57% 
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Panel B: Arbitrage return by market value and opening delay 
Quartiles of 
market value 
Quartiles of 
opening delay 
Above average 
portfolio return 
“Sell” 
(A) 
Below average 
portfolio return 
“Buy” 
(B) 
Trading 
Profit 
Buy - Sell 
(B – A) 
1 (Smallest) 1 (Fastest) -1.47% 0.77% 2.25% 
1 (Smallest) 2 -1.36% 0.74% 2.10% 
1 (Smallest) 3 -1.02% 0.50% 1.52% 
1 (Smallest) 4 (Slowest) -0.37% 0.20% 0.57% 
2 1 (Fastest) -1.09% 0.41% 1.50% 
2 2 -1.15% 0.57% 1.72% 
2 3 -0.90% 0.36% 1. 26% 
2 4 (Slowest) -0.37% 0.20% 0.57% 
3 1 (Fastest) -0.93% 0.32% 1.25% 
3 2 -0.95% 0.44% 1.39% 
3 3 -0.73% 0.30% 1.03% 
3 4 (Slowest) -0.37% 0.23% 0.60% 
4 (Largest) 1 (Fastest) -0.49% 0.19% 0.68% 
4 (Largest) 2 -0.59% 0.33% 0.92% 
4 (Largest) 3 -0.55% 0.27% 0.82% 
4 (Largest) 4 (Slowest) -0.31% 0.29% 0.60% 
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C. Learning Opportunity and Opening Return Volatility 
The model predicts that learning effect reduces pricing error of a stock without 
trading the stock. For each stock, I count the number of prior opening transactions of 
other stocks every day. I call this variable ‘prior-openings’. If a stock opened later than 5 
other stocks in a market, it would have 5 as prior-openings. The setting reflects the 
feature of the model that pricing error is decreasing in the number of prior peer 
transactions. Also note that, as in table 4, prior-openings variable is significantly 
negatively correlated with measures of liquidity. 
To capture the pricing error at opening, I use the return volatility derived from the 
opening prices. Typically, the daily return is measured by the price change between two 
consecutive closing prices. Here two consecutive opening prices are used to calculate the 
daily return, which is then used to calculate monthly standard deviation of the return. The 
model predicts that the pricing error should be decreasing as investors have greater 
opportunity to learn from peer stock prices. The second hypothesis is formally stated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Opening return volatility decreases in prior-openings of peer stocks. 
 
As a dependent variable, I rank opening return variance into 11 categories and adjust 
the rank as follows: 
5.0)10/__(_ −= categoriesreturnOpeningvolOpen  
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Table 4 
Correlation among different liquidity variables 
 
Prior-openings count the number of other stocks opened before a stock has its first trade. Bid-ask 
spread is the difference between quoted bid and ask prices. Dollar volume is calculated by a 
stock’s closing price and volume. Depth is the sum of average bid size and ask size in share 
numbers. The probability that correlation coefficient is actually zero is in parentheses. 
 
 Prior-openings Bid-ask Spread Dollar Volume Depth 
Prior-openings 
 
0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.29 
(0.00) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 
Bid-ask Spread 
0.28 
(0.00)    
Dollar Volume 
-0.29 
(0.00)    
Depth 
-0.21 
(0.00)    
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This process is used in Mendenhall (2004) or Bernard and Thomas (1990) to control 
the skewness and outliers in the variable. The opening return volatility has range between 
-0.5 and 0.5. 0.1 is the difference between two consecutive deciles. 
While the prior-openings variable is a daily value, the opening return volatility is a 
monthly statistic. The monthly average values of the prior-openings are used as an 
explanatory variable. Using monthly measures reduces the sample size and may reduce 
overall explanatory power of the model. The regression equation has a monthly panel 
data structure. 
 
Open_volim imimim Zp επ +⋅Γ+⋅=                        (7) 
           where pim is average number of prior-openings and Zim is a matrix of control 
variables 
 
If the opening friction decreases in investors’ learning opportunity, the sign of π 
should be negative. The control variables are: natural log of the market value, the opening 
volume (the number of shares traded in the first trade), the Herfindahl index of industry 
sales and a trading halt dummy. The log of market value is added to control for firm size 
and firm’s sensitivity to overnight information. The market value is calculated using daily 
closing price and daily shares outstanding in the CRSP database. Opening volume 
controls the size of trading activity at the open. To account for the effect of industry 
structure, I include the Herfindahl index of sales, taken from Compustat quarterly 
database. The trading halt dummy takes value 1 if there is any trading halt for the stock 
during the month. Trading halts usually occur when there is special information event in 
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a stock, so the stock experiencing a halt may have extra volatility. Except for the 
Herfindahl index and trading halt dummy, the other control variables are daily values, so 
I use the monthly averages of them in the regressions. 
To control cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, I use OLS with an 
error structure that accounts for firm and year clustering. I also include year dummies to 
control year fixed effects. Petersen (2007) shows such estimation works well in panel 
datasets. To prevent a few outliers driving the result, I drop a month’s observation if the 
average opening delay (time between 9:30 am and the first trade) is larger than 30 
minutes. 
Table 5 shows stock volatility is a decreasing function of the prior-openings. This 
result is consistent with the model’s prediction that more opportunities to observe other 
peer stock prices lead to lower volatility. The size stratified result shows that the learning 
effect is not restricted to small, infrequently traded stocks. Rather, stocks with 
considerable size show a more significant learning effect. In order to show economic 
significance, table 5 also reports the regression result that uses minutes-to-first-trade as 
the main explanatory variable, instead of the prior-openings. The coefficient is negative 
0.01. Because the difference between deciles is 0.1, this coefficient indicates the opening 
return volatility drops to the next lowest decile when a stock opens 10 minutes later. 
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Table 5 
Analysis of opening return volatility 
 
Model:      Open_volim imimim Zp επ +⋅Γ+⋅=                      (7) 
 
Dependent variable is monthly opening return variance. The opening return is calculated from 
two consecutive opening prices. pim is prior-openings and Zim is the matrix of control variables: 
market value, opening volume, Herfindahl index, and trading halt dummy. Prior-opening 
measures how many other stocks opened before the stock, and it is an inverse indicator of stock 
liquidity at open. To be included in the data, monthly average opening delay should be less or 
equal to 30 minutes. I run an OLS regression that is corrected for firm or year clustering and 
heteroskedastic error structure. Year dummies are used in the regression. In Panel A and B, 
coefficients are multiplied by 104 for visual convenience. T-values are in the parenthesis and 
significant variables in 1% level are marked with *.  
 
Panel A: Regressions with different explanatory variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Prior-openings 
-2.24* 
(-75.23) 
-1.00* 
(-39.83)  
-2.23* 
(-75.50) 
Market Value 
-770.63* 
(-69.58)  
-242.73* 
(26.46) 
-769.89* 
(-69.63) 
Opening Volume 
0.10* 
(3.14)    
Herfindahl 
864.63* 
(12.98)   
865.33* 
(12.99) 
Trading Halt 
0.26 
(0.00)    
 
Observations 31391 31391 31391 31391 
Adj. R-square 18.2% 5.4% 2.6% 18.2% 
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Panel B: Regressions by market value quartiles 
 All Stocks Size (Min) Size (2) Size (3) Size (Max) 
Prior-openings 
-2.24* 
(-75.23) 
-1.63* 
(-18.00) 
-2.21* 
(-25.38) 
-2.43* 
(-24.51) 
-2.45* 
(-18.99) 
Market Value 
-770.63* 
(-69.58) 
-1214.14* 
(-17.04) 
-830.63* 
(-6.04) 
-558.76* 
(-3.81) 
-658.11* 
(-12.34) 
Opening Volume 
0.10* 
(3.14) 
0.13 
(2.32) 
0.11 
(1.72) 
0.05 
(1.27) 
-0.14 
(-2.30) 
Herfindahl 
864.63* 
(12.98) 
1242.65* 
(5.51) 
354.60 
(1.54) 
403.03 
(1.38) 
1461.94* 
(4.91) 
Trading Halt 
0.26 
(0.00) 
-269.11 
(-2.05) 
73.63 
(0.58) 
371.22 
(2.44) 
662.85 
(2.79) 
 
Observations 31391 7827 7860 7870 7846 
Adj. R-square 18.2% 13.7% 17.9% 21.3% 26.7% 
 
Panel C: Regressions with minutes-to-open variable 
 All Stocks Size (Min) Size (2) Size (3) Size (Max) 
Minutes-to-Open 
-0.010* 
(-45.53) 
-0.009* 
(-20.69) 
-0.012* 
(-22.46) 
-0.015* 
(-21.87) 
-0.013* 
(-9.91) 
Market Value 
-0.045* 
(-45.75) 
-0.1263* 
(-18.67) 
-0.073* 
(-5.21) 
-0.056* 
(-3.64) 
-0.017* 
(-3.02) 
Opening Volume 
0.000 
(1.49) 
0.000 
(2.09) 
0.000 
(1.27) 
0.000 
(0.86) 
-0.000* 
(-3.69) 
Herfindahl 
0.095* 
(13.47) 
0.107* 
(4.78) 
0.026 
(1.05) 
0.057 
(1.89) 
0.176* 
(5.40) 
Trading Halt 
0.03* 
(3.88) 
-0.007 
(0.56) 
0.055* 
(4.02) 
0.089* 
(4.98) 
0.103 
(3.86) 
 
Observations 31391 7824 7856 7869 7846 
Adj. R-square 9.8% 14.2% 12.5% 13.3% 16.4% 
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D. Learning Opportunity and Opening Friction 
The analysis in table 5 does not differentiate two sources of stock volatility – the 
volatility from information itself and the volatility from pricing error. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) compares the opening return volatility 
with the losing return volatility to overcome this issue. Let opening return be the return 
between two consecutive opening prices, and the closing return be the return between two 
consecutive closing prices. Then take the monthly standard deviation of daily returns to 
get their volatility. The difference between the two volatilities (opening and closing), 
which is opening friction, represents the pricing error in opening prices, because two 
volatilities share the same 24-hour amount of information.  
As a first step, I check whether the opening variance is also higher than the closing 
variance in 1997~2002 period for the NASDAQ data set. Table 6 confirms the opening 
variance is still 20% larger than the closing variance, as in Amihud and Mendelson 
(1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990). 
According to the model, the error in estimating the value of the information should be 
decreasing as opportunity to learn from other stock prices rises. The error in the opening 
price can be measured by the difference between the opening return volatility and the 
closing return volatility. So my third hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Opening friction decreases in the prior-openings. 
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Figure 6. Comparing two returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day t 
Opening P0 Opening P1 Closing P0 Closing P1 
Day t+1 
Opening P2 Closing P2 
Day t+2 
Opening Ret Opening Ret 
Closing Ret Closing Ret 
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Table 6 
Size of opening friction 
 
The stock returns are calculated from two consecutive opening prices (opening return) or two 
consecutive closing prices (closing return). Then I calculate monthly variation of two returns and 
divide opening return variation by closing return variation. To be included in the data, monthly 
average opening delay should be less or equal to 30 minutes. A number larger than 100% shows 
the opening variance is larger than the closing variance. 
 
 
Market Value 
deciles 
Opening friction 
= opening variance / closing variance 
Observations 
Min 125% 3137 
2 128% 3141 
3 123% 3139 
4 134% 3140 
5 121% 3138 
6 115% 3142 
7 116% 3139 
8 114% 3138 
9 116% 3141 
Max 108% 3136 
All stocks 120% 31398 
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Although opening friction in the literature is defined as the ratio between opening 
volatility and closing volatility, the ratio is not a good variable to use in OLS estimation. 
One problem with the ratio is that the measure is sensitive to the size of the denominator. 
This feature makes the variable highly skewed, and produces many outliers. So I subtract 
closing variance from opening variance and rank the difference into 11 categories. Then 
the deciles are modified as follows: 
5.0)10/_(var_ −= rankdifferencefriction  
                 where var_difference = opening return variance – closing 
return variance 
 
The structure of the test is the same as in the previous section, except that dependent 
variable is opening friction, instead of opening return volatility. We can see which 
variable is related to aggregate volatility and which variable is correlated with the pricing 
error only. 
frictionim imimim Zp επ +⋅Γ+⋅=            (8) 
 
Table 7 shows the result of the estimation. I find opening friction is decreasing in the 
number of prior-openings. This result indicates that liquid stocks tend to have larger 
pricing errors. Comparing the result with the one in the previous section, opening volume 
and the Herfindahl index lose significance. Therefore, the size of the individual trade and 
industry structure are related to volatility of information arrivals rather, than volatility 
from pricing error. Panel C controls for the effect of bid-ask spread by using variances 
calculated from mid-quote returns. The mid-quote returns are derived from the quotes 
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nearest to open and the quotes nearest to close. I find the result is robust, and adjusted R-
square significantly increases. 
I expect the size of opening friction will decrease in calendar time since there are 
increasing sources of to obtain price information available during the overnight periods. 
Specifically, there are more stocks listed in international markets. The volume of ECN is 
growing. There are more NASDAQ pre-opening quotes. Derivatives market is expanding 
to give more transaction information. Huang (2002) investigates the price information 
coming from ECNs. Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000) and Biais, Hillion, and Spatt 
(1999) show pre-opening quotes are closely related to subsequent transactions. Huang 
and Stoll (1994) argue investors can use futures price to discover the true price of a stock. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of opening friction 
 
Model:   frictionim imimim Zp επ +⋅Γ+⋅=                     (8) 
 
To reduce the skewness and outlier problem, I rank the difference between opening return 
variance and closing return variance into deciles, and use it as dependent variable. pim is prior-
openings and Zim is the matrix of control variables: market value, individual first volume, 
Herfindahl index, and trading halt dummy. Prior-opening measures how many other stocks 
opened before the stock, and it is an inverse indicator of stock liquidity at open. To be included in 
the data, monthly average opening delay should be less or equal to 30 minutes. I run an OLS 
regression that is corrected for firm or year clustering and heteroskedastic error structure. Year 
dummies are used in the regression. All coefficients are multiplied by 104 for visual convenience. 
T-values are in the parenthesis and significant variables in 1% level are marked with *.  
 
Panel A: Regressions with different explanatory variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Prior-openings 
-0.55* 
(-15.18) 
-0.17* 
(-5.69)  
-0.55* 
(-15.41) 
Market Value 
-231.25* 
(-16.71)  
-102.59* 
(-8.94) 
-232.13* 
(-16.82) 
Opening Volume 
-0.00 
(-0.34)    
Herfindahl 
14.20 
(0.18)    
Trading Halt 
84.43 
(0.99)    
 
Observations 31391 31391 31391 31391 
Adj. R-square 1.2% 0.2% 0.4% 1.2% 
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Panel B: Regressions by market value quartiles 
 All Stocks Size (Min) Size (2) Size (3) Size (Max) 
Prior-openings 
-0.55* 
(-15.18) 
-0.71* 
(-8.54) 
-0.47* 
(-6.81) 
-0.65* 
(-10.41) 
-0.27* 
(-3.70) 
Market Value 
-231.25* 
(-16.71) 
-53.98 
(-0.80) 
-441.09* 
(-4.09) 
-381.75* 
(-3.79) 
-84.83* 
(-2.66) 
Opening Volume 
-0.00 
(-0.34) 
0.00 
(0.62) 
-0.16 
(-2.15) 
0.03 
(0.84) 
-0.10 
(-1.57) 
Herfindahl 
14.20 
(0.18) 
81.85 
(0.47) 
40.03 
(0.28) 
-236.05 
(-1.66) 
116.43 
(0.70) 
Trading Halt 
84.43 
(0.99) 
17.40 
(0.11) 
240.91 
(1.65) 
26.56 
(0.16) 
87.90 
(0.36) 
 
Observations 31391 7827 7860 7870 7846 
Adj. R-square 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 1.7% 1.3% 
 
Panel C: Regressions using variances from mid-quote returns 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Prior-openings 
-1.34* 
(-24.50) 
-1.68* 
(-33.91)  
-1.34* 
(-24.70) 
Market Value 
250.48* 
(12.06)  
535.66* 
(28.01) 
249.53* 
(12.01) 
Opening Volume 
0.17* 
(4.22)  
0.03 
(0.94) 
0.17* 
(4.20) 
Herfindahl 
216.05 
(1.85)    
Trading Halt 
-72.67 
(-0.58)    
 
Observations 24796 24796 24796 24796 
Adj. R-square 10.2% 9.2% 6.5% 10.2% 
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F. Learning Effect vs. Stock Characteristics 
One can argue that lower opening volatility and opening friction is a result of stock 
characteristics rather than a function of learning effect. To check this possibility, I study 
the case when a same stock’s learning opportunity increases or decreases. For each stock, 
I calculate a stock’s prior-openings change between two months. Then I compare it with 
the stock’s volatility change during the same period. If my previous findings are mostly a 
result of stock characteristics, there will be little correlation between prior-openings 
change and volatility change. I use the same procedure to test correlation between prior-
openings change and opening frictions change. 
Table 8 shows the results. There is a significant negative correlation between prior-
openings change and volatility change. The negative correlation is consistent with 
learning framework, because it means that a stock’s volatility decreases when the stock 
gets more learning opportunity. The case of opening friction also shows a significant 
negative correlation. These results confirm that volatility and pricing error is a decreasing 
function of learning opportunity rather than a result of stock characteristics. 
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Table 8 
Change of learning opportunity 
 
For each stock, I take out the cases when a stock’s prior-openings changes. Then I compare it 
with the stock’s volatility change and opening friction change during the same period. I report 
correlation between the changes. 
 
 
 Opening volatility change Opening friction change 
Correlation with prior-
opening change 
-0.226 -0.034 
P-value of correlation 
coefficient 
0.00 0.00 
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IV. Conclusion 
This paper extends the literature on stocks volatility in two ways. First, I propose a 
price discovery model focusing on the volatility generated by the error in converting 
information into stock prices. While there are many models of volatility induced by 
private information, there are few models of volatility due to pricing error. This paper’s 
model can be applied to pricing errors related phenomena, such as market opening 
frictions. 
Second, I study the role of peer stocks on individual stock’s volatility. The basic 
assumption is that information about one stock affects other stocks as well. Investors 
update their estimate of the value of a new piece of information by looking at the 
transaction prices of peer stocks. Thus, a stock where investors can observe more 
transactions of peer stocks should have less error in its price changes. The liquidity of 
peer stocks is beneficial, because investors would have a larger price data of peer stocks. 
Third, less trading does not necessarily mean more pricing error. The learning effect 
can reduce pricing error of a stock without much trading. This implication questions the 
idea that a higher liquidity is always beneficial. Although scarce trading may delay price 
discovery process, excessive trading can also add noise to stock prices. 
I verify the model’s predictions using NASDAQ opening prices. In my dataset, 
opening prices contain a larger pricing error compared to closing prices. The higher 
pricing error can be explained by the model’s prediction that a stock’s pricing error 
increases when investors cannot observe the prices of peer stocks. I show that stock 
returns mean-revert to the cross sectional average after the market opening. This 
phenomenon is consistent with the model’s implication that mean-reversion occurs when 
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investors use peer stock price data to reduce pricing error in a particular stock. I also find 
that volatility and pricing error in opening prices decreases in a stock’s learning 
opportunity. Stocks that open later than others tend to have less pricing error in their 
opening prices and have a weaker tendency to mean-revert. 
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Appendix: Proof of Results 
 
Result 1: A stock’s price change after an information event’s arrival converges to the average 
price change of its peer stocks. 
 
Proof 1: Assume trading cost is small compared to prices. The average of stock price changes is: 
           ∑
=
+
n
i
ievn 1
)(1  , where n is the number of the stocks in the peers 
 
   Now think of a strategy that sells stocks that moved higher than sample average and buys 
stocks that moved lower than sample average. Stock price change eventually converges to v. The 
profit of this strategy for a stock j that moved higher than sample average is: 
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   This equation can be simplified as: 
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   The sample average of errors, ∑
=
n
i
ien 1
)(1 , is a normally distributed variable because ei is 
normally distributed. Taking this strategy continuously over time, sample average of the errors 
converges to 0 in probability by Law of Large Numbers. Then ej becomes the random draw from 
truncated distribution that has minimum 0 on average. Because the expected value of the 
minimum is 0, expected value of ej is positive. By the same logic, profit from a stock moved 
lower than sample average is also positive. 
    Rational investors would take this opportunity, and by combining several stocks, they can 
create an arbitrage position. In no arbitrage market, these trading activities should bring stock 
prices to industry sample average.    ▄ 
 52 
Result 2: A stock’s price change after the information arrival becomes more accurate, the larger is 
the sample of previously traded peer stocks. 
 
Proof 2: I show the accuracy of sample average depends on the number of traded stocks. Let there 
be l traded stocks. The variance of this industry average is: 
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   Since error term e is independent each other, the covariance term is 0. 
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   As l gets larger, variance of sample average gets lower. A stock trading after observing this 
average can estimate the true value with lower error.     ▄ 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IS ORDER IMBALANCE RELATED TO INFORMATION? 
 
I. Introduction 
Order imbalance is the signed volume that measures direction and degree of buying 
or selling pressure. Such trading pressure can signal investors’ interest in a particular 
stock, and order imbalance may predict future stock returns (Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
2004). Market participants give considerable effort to estimate order imbalance, and 
investigate what information is underlying it. It is easy to assume that order imbalance is 
an indicator of private information, because random orders would be unlikely to have a 
consistent direction. Practitioners are already using the idea that order imbalance shows 
underlying information. Wall Street Journal posts daily order imbalance under the name 
‘Buying on Weakness’ or ‘Selling on Strength’. 
However, some papers that use order imbalance data find weak correlation between 
order imbalance and information arrivals. Andrade, Chang, and Seasholes (2008) argue 
significant amount of trading imbalances are uninformed trading, but the imbalances 
affect stock returns. Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and Wu (2008) show order imbalance is not 
particularly good at capturing the presence of informed trading. Lee (1992) and Trueman, 
Wong, and Zhang (2003) find investors do not place orders according to announced 
information. Even if a large, positive earnings surprise occurs, for example, order 
imbalance is not always positive. On the other hand, order imbalance exhibits consistent 
patterns, which suggest the presence of rational trading activity. Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004) find daily order imbalance is serially correlated, and past order 
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imbalance predicts future returns. They explain this finding within the framework of Kyle 
(1985). Kyle (1985) models the trading strategy of a rational investor, who has private 
information. The investor splits her order into a number of small orders to hide the 
private information from public, and such order fragmentation makes order imbalance 
serially correlated. Thus, under his framework, order imbalance reflects private 
information. Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996), and Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara 
(1997) also argue private positive or negative information generates buying or selling 
pressure respectively. 
The question of whether order imbalance is related to information is important 
because order imbalance has close link with asset prices. Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(2004) and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) find a stock’s order imbalance is 
positively correlated with its future return. Bollen and Whaley (2004) shows option 
values are affected by buying or selling pressure. Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) find order 
imbalance is a major source of bond yield fluctuations. The connection between order 
imbalance and asset prices can contain different meanings depending on the origin of the 
order imbalance. The relation between order imbalance and return, and the relation 
between return and information has been actively investigated over the last 10 years, but 
the relation between order imbalance and information has not received much attention yet. 
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Figure 1. Triangular relation among return, information, and order imbalance 
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To shed light on the triangular relation among returns, order imbalance, and 
information, this paper studies the link between order imbalance and information. I focus 
on stock earnings surprises. An earnings surprise is defined as the difference between 
actual earnings and average analyst expectations, which measures the size of the 
informational shock by the market. Numerous papers including Bernard and Thomas 
(1990), Bhushan (1994), Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000), and Mendenhall 
(2004) use earnings surprises to proxy the size of new information shocks. My test is has 
two parts: First, I test whether order imbalance acts as an indicator of private information. 
If order imbalance is generated by private information, it may well predict the 
forthcoming major information event like an earnings surprise. The second part of the test 
is whether order imbalance is correlated with public information. If order imbalance 
reflects a public announcement, a positive earnings surprise would be accompanied by 
positive order imbalance and vice versa. I construct empirical hypotheses from the 
existing theories on order imbalance. Because these theories are based on the 
assumptions of market efficiency and rational investors, my tests can also be used as 
evidence for/against market efficiency and rational investors. 
I find following relation between order imbalance and information: 
(1) Order imbalance has no reliable predictive power for a forthcoming information 
event. Order imbalance before an earnings announcement date has in general 
insignificant correlations with earnings surprise. Moreover, order imbalance does a poor 
job in predicting whether there will be a positive earnings surprise or not. This result is 
disappointing to investors who want to use order imbalances to aid their investment 
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decisions, but it is consistent with weak market efficiency hypothesis which tells that past 
data cannot predict subsequent stock returns. 
(2) Order imbalances at earnings announcements act independently of earnings 
surprise. This result can be explained in market efficiency framework. When information 
arrives, market makers quickly adjust their quotes according to the information. If they 
move faster than other traders, the adjusted quote level reflects the announcement and 
there is no need to place additional buy or sell orders as a result of the public 
announcement. Thus, order imbalance can be independent of the announcement. The 
weak correlation between order imbalance and public information arrival can be evidence 
of market makers’ fast quote movements. Fleming and Remolona (1999) find in the 
Treasury market that quote adjustments precede trades when major economic data is 
publicly released. 
(3) Past earnings announcements have a positive correlation with order imbalance. 
After earnings data are released to the public, order imbalance starts to mimic the 
earnings surprise for several days. This pattern continues for several days after the public 
announcement. Unlike (1) or (2), this result cannot be explained by the market efficiency 
hypothesis. Why should investors place orders according to the past information that has 
no value in an efficient market? The correlation between order imbalances and past 
earnings announcements can not be ignored, because I find stock prices also react to 
order imbalances. 
My three results show that the relationship between order imbalance and information 
is complicated. Order imbalance has weak correlation with information before 
announcement dates, which is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. However, 
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order imbalance has correlation with past information, which can be explained by 
investors’ irrational behaviors. Without proper framework that can explain the behaviors 
of order imbalance, using order imbalance variable in investment decisions can be a risky 
idea. 
 
II. Hypotheses on Order Imbalance and Information 
I start by constructing hypotheses on relation between order imbalance and 
information, based on the assumption of efficient markets. Following standard procedure 
of Lee and Ready (1992), order imbalance is calculated by subtracting the trades in bid 
side (selling pressure) from the trades in ask side (buying pressure). There will be 
relatively more bid side transactions when current quotes are above market’s consensus 
price, and vice versa. Therefore, order imbalance captures the dispersion of opinion 
between market makers (who sets quotes) and other investors. Even if there is highly 
positive information, order imbalance can be negative if market makers post their quotes 
above the consensus price. The following figure compares two cases: when market 
makers change their quotes according to positive information and when they do not. 
Order imbalance will not reflect the value of public information if market makers change 
their quotes quickly. 
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Figure 2. Quote speed and order imbalance. 
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A. Order imbalance and private information 
Due to its dependence on current quote level, order imbalances follow the direction of 
information when market makers do not instantly adjust their quotes. When market 
makers do not know the information that some other investors do, the informed investors 
would trade based on their private information, and their trade will generate order 
imbalance. If the private information is to be announced later, the order imbalance pattern 
would predict the forthcoming announcement. 
Kyle (1985) is one of the most cited models of relation between private information 
and order imbalance.14
nnnn tpvx ∆−=∆ − )~~(~ 1β
 He uses game theory to explain the relation between order 
imbalance and information when the information is not public. In other words, 
information is private in his model. His model shows order imbalance is a function of 
information, market depth, and price level. 
                                       (1) 
        ,where β is a decreasing function of market depth λ. 
Δx is order placement of informed investors, β is a decreasing function of Kyle’s 
lambda λ (market depth), v is value of private information, p is stock’s price level, t is the 
time left until information is publicly announced, and there are N trades before the 
information is announced. 
 
β is decreasing in λ, so I substitute β with f-1(λ). f(λ) is an increasing function of λ. 
Rewriting equation (1), I get: 
                                                 
14 Back and Bruch (2004) extend Kyle (1985) model to show that the model’s implications also hold in 
continuous trading. Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) uses Kyle (1985) model to explain serial 
correlation of order imbalance. 
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Equation (2) states that value of private information is related to informed order 
placement Δx, market depth λ, and previous price p. Equation (2) is also empirically 
testable, because all the variables can be obtained from stock market. Although informed 
order placement is not observable to the public, order imbalance will be proportional to 
Δx, because other orders have no direction. All investors observe aggregate order flow Δx 
+ η, where η is order flow with zero mean. Hence, order imbalance is an unbiased 
estimator of informed order placement Δx. Using standard regression techniques, one can 
filter out the effect of η, because the mean of η is zero. Equation (3) substitutes informed 
order placement Δx with observed order imbalance Δx + η. 
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By taking average of equation (3), we get: 
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Equation (4) shows that the value of information is increasing in previous price level 
and the product of order imbalance and Kyle’s lambda. Because Kyle’s lambda and 
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previous price level can be estimated using past data, investors can detect the value of 
information using contemporaneous order imbalance. The time frame Δt can be 
substituted with 1 when one uses same time frame to estimate order imbalance (ex. daily 
order imbalance). 
The validity of equation (4) can be tested using regression equation (5): 
For stock i, information announcement at day t, 
itjtijitjitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−− 1,21 )()(                (5) 
,where j indicates the time between the forthcoming information announcement and 
current order imbalance. 
 
Equation (5) substitutes informed order flow with order imbalance and uses stock 
return in place of price level. δ1 and δ2 are variables to estimate. I use stock return in 
equation (5) because price level in Kyle’s model does not account for price level 
variation across stocks, but represents the amount of information captured by price. In a 
cross sectional regression, return is a more appropriate choice to measure the effect. 
Following Kyle (1985), my first empirical hypothesis is that δ1 in equation (5) is 
positive and significant. 
H1: Order imbalance is positively correlated with the value of forthcoming 
information. 
 
B. Order imbalance and public information 
Although order imbalance can be a function of private information, order imbalance 
reacts differently to public information. When there is a public announcement, market 
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makers also know the information. Order imbalance may still reflect the direction of a 
public information announcement, when market makers fail to adjust their quotes quickly 
enough to the announcement. However, in an efficient market, quote adjustment should 
be faster than any trades. 
Suppose there is a positive announcement from a company. If market makers do not 
change their quote quickly, they would sell their stocks at discount and some investors 
may make profit from the public announcement. This violates semi-strong efficiency, 
which requires a public announcement to have no investment value. Hence, in a semi-
strong efficient market, quotes should move before any trade comes in.15
Equation (2) can be modified to express public information case. When price 
instantly adjusts to the value of the announced information, v = p in equation (2).  
 This 
independence argument may seem to contradict equation (2), which states that order 
imbalance has some connection to the value of upcoming information. However, both 
arguments are based on the assumption that market is efficient. It is the timing of 
announcement or the nature of information that changes the behavior of order imbalance. 
In efficient market, order imbalance may predict forthcoming information, but reflect 
current announcement. 
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Then informed order placement Δx becomes zero. 
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15 Fama (1970) explains the definition of semi-strong efficiency. In such market, no investor should be 
able to profit from public information. 
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This argument implies that in any semi-strong efficient market, public information 
will be converted to price in a 2-step procedure. In step one, public information arrives 
and quotes first adjust according to the information. Trades occur in the second step to 
trade based on the quote level. Such 2-step procedure means that without any help from 
trading, investors can successfully estimate the unbiased price from public information. 
Fleming and Remolona (1999) find such 2-step pattern in Treasury Bill market. 
So my second hypothesis is: 
H2: Order imbalance is independent of contemporaneous public announcement. 
 
If hypothesis 2 is valid, order imbalance should be also independent of past 
announcement. Unless information is serially correlated, order imbalance would not 
reflect past information.16
H3: Order imbalance is independent of past announcement. 
 
 
I will test these 3 hypotheses in the next section. 
 
III. Data and Method 
I use Trade and Quote (TAQ) data for ordinary common shares from 1996 to 2004 to 
construct order imbalance data. The construction method is in appendix, and it closely 
follows the method of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002). Their method is based 
on Lee and Ready (1992), but it imposes additional filters to reduce problems from scarce 
trading. I report the results using order imbalance of shares, dollars, and number of trades. 
                                                 
16 Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) find some information can be serially correlated, such as earnings 
information. 
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In my dataset, order imbalance of shares and order imbalance of dollars have 99% 
positive correlation, while order imbalance of trades has a lower 83% positive correlation 
with other two measures. I normalize order imbalance measures by dividing it by daily 
aggregate share volume, dollar volume, or number of trades respectively. This setting 
allows cross sectional comparisons across stocks. 
As in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), I use mid-quote stock returns to take out 
the effect of bid-ask bounce. The mid-quotes data comes from Market Microstructure 
Database in Vanderbilt University. The database contains average trade weighted bid 
price and ask price during a day. I take mid-quote prices from the bid price and the ask 
price, and calculate continuously compounded return using two consecutive mid-quote 
prices (taking natural logarithm of the ratio). 
In order to measure the value of information, I choose earnings announcement event. 
For each earnings announcement, there are analyst forecasts for earnings per share. The 
earnings surprise, which is the difference between the forecasted earnings (analyst 
consensus) and the actual earnings, represents the value of information to the stock 
market. Earnings surprise data comes from IBES database. I use quarterly earnings 
announcements. I use the most recent earnings per share (EPS) forecasts for each analyst, 
and if the forecast is more than 90 days old, I drop the forecast. I require stocks to have 
more than 5 recent forecasts. Mendenhall (2004) and other earnings surprise related 
papers define earnings surprise as follows: Earnings surprise is difference between actual 
earnings and average analyst EPS forecasts, divided by standard deviation of the 
forecasts. 
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where i is one firm and q is one quarter. 
 
Bernard and Thomas (1990) use ranks of the earnings surprise to account for non 
linearity and outlier problem. As Mendenhall (2004) suggests, I rank earnings surprise 
into 11 ranks and then divide 11 and subtract 0.5 from the variable. The ranked earnings 
surprise variable has its mean around 0, and 0.1 is the difference between two close ranks. 
I call this variable surprise rank. 
Stoll (2000) shows Kyle’s lambda λ can be measured as the sensitivity of stock return 
to order imbalance. For every trading day, I use 250 prior business days of order 
imbalance data to estimate Kyle’s lambda. I regress stock return on order imbalance, and 
Kyle’s lambda is the coefficient. Because of the lambda estimation, the final data set has 
time period from 1997 to 2004. After all the adjustments, I have 2,854 earnings 
announcements in my dataset. 
The following figures show average order imbalance and mid-quote return by 3 ranks 
of earnings surprise. 
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Order Imbalance around Earnings Announcement
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Figure 3. Order imbalance and mid-quote return around earnings announcements 
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IV. Empirical Tests 
 
A. Order imbalance and private information 
First I test the predictive power of order imbalance using equation (5). 
itjtijitjitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−− 1,21 )()(         (5) 
 
If coefficient δ1 is statistically significant and economically meaningful, order 
imbalance would be a useful variable to predict upcoming earnings announcement. 
Regression method is OLS with clustering and heteroskedasticity controlled error 
structure. I control for clustering by firm, year, and quarter. Petersen (2007) shows such 
correction yields a consistent estimation for panel data sets. 
Table 1 shows δ1 is mostly insignificant. This result indicates order imbalance has 
almost no forecasting power for future announcement. δ1 is only significant at 2 days 
before an announcement. At that point, order imbalance has little value for investors 
because the order imbalance is measured after market close. Investors have only 1 
business day to trade based on the order imbalance, and by that time, there can be a quite 
a lot of information leakage such as CEOs announcing hints about their earnings. Even if 
the leakage does not occur, order imbalance is not useful for investment decisions 
because of its lack of significance. Adjusted R-square is lower than 1%, and the size of 
the coefficient is less than 1. Given that order imbalance has range between -1 ~ +1 and 
my Kyle’s lambda variable has average value of 0.12, the small size of coefficient 
implies that order imbalance can explain at most one-tenth of difference in earnings 
surprise rank. 
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Table 1 – Order imbalance and private information 
 
itjtijitjitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−− 1,21 )()(         (5) 
 
Earnings surprise measure v is derived from the difference between actual earnings and average 
analyst forecasts. I rank the earnings surprise into 11 ranks, divide it by 10, and subtract 0.5. OI is 
order imbalance and rt-1 is previous day’s mid-quote stock return. For every trading day, I use 250 
prior business days of order imbalance data to estimate Kyle’s lambda. I regress stock return on 
order imbalance, and Kyle’s lambda is the coefficient. Regression method for equation (3) is OLS 
with clustering and heteroskedasticity controlled error structure. P-values are in the parenthesis. 
Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Regression with order imbalance of shares 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.939
b 
(0.01) 
0.235 
(0.40) 1578 0.5% 
3 0.322 (0.39) 
0.291c 
(0.07) 1629 0.2% 
4 -0.646
c 
(0.06) 
0.188 
(0.20) 1924 0.2% 
5 0.681 (0.18) 
0.087 
(0.75) 1601 0.1% 
6 0.235 (0.57) 
0.065 
(0.68) 2209 0.0% 
7 0.625
c 
(0.07) 
0.067 
(0.61) 2891 0.1% 
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Panel B: Regression with order imbalance of dollars 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.940
b 
(0.01) 
0.235 
(0.40) 1578 0.5% 
3 0.316 (0.40) 
0.291c 
(0.07) 1629 0.2% 
4 -0.649
c 
(0.06) 
0.189 
(0.20) 1924 0.2% 
5 0.681 (0.19) 
0.088 
(0.75) 1601 0.1% 
6 0.235 (0.57) 
0.066 
(0.68) 2209 0.0% 
7 0.614
c 
(0.08) 
0.068 
(0.61) 2891 0.1% 
 
Panel C: Regression with order imbalance of trades 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.841
a 
(0.00) 
0.273 
(0.33) 1578 0.6% 
3 0.688
b 
(0.01) 
0.282c 
(0.08) 1629 0.6% 
4 0.141 (0.61) 
0.181 
(0.22) 1924 0.1% 
5 0.552 (0.11) 
0.102 
(0.71) 1601 0.2% 
6 0.303 (0.29) 
0.073 
(0.64) 2209 0.1% 
7 0.320 (0.14) 
0.087 
(0.51) 2891 0.1% 
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In table 2, I run regressions after including contemporaneous order imbalance in 
equation (5). As in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), order imbalances are serially 
correlated, and so having contemporaneous order imbalance in the test equation may 
reveal additional explanatory power of order imbalance. Contemporaneous order 
imbalance is average order imbalance in (-1, +1) day window around an announcement 
date.17
ititjtijitjitit OIrOIv εδδλδα +⋅+⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−− )()()( 31,21
 
     (5)’ 
 
Table 2 shows that order imbalance does not gain much explanatory power by adding 
contemporaneous order imbalance. Again I find that δ1 is insignificant in most cases, R-
squares are low, and coefficients are too small to be economically meaningful. 
The low significance of δ1 may come from strategic trading of informed investors. For 
example, Back and Baruch (2004) argue informed traders can place fake orders to 
disguise their trading. My result points to three possibilities. 1) Informed investors are 
very good at hiding their trades, 2) order imbalance is generated by some other factor 
than information, or 3) the model specification of equation (5) is incorrect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Even if I use only order imbalances at announcement dates, I get qualitatively similar results. 
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Table 2 – Regressions with contemporaneous order imbalance 
 
ititjtijitjitit OIrOIv εδδλδα +⋅+⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−− )()()( 31,21      (5)’ 
 
Contemporaneous order imbalance 
itOI  is the average order imbalance in (-1, +1) day window 
around an earnings announcement. Regression method for equation (3) is OLS with clustering 
and heteroskedasticity controlled error structure. P-values are in the parenthesis. Coefficients 
significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Regression with order imbalance of shares, with contemporaneous order imbalances 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 δ3 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.881
b 
(0.02) 
0.224 
(0.42) 
0.064 
(0.32) 1578 0.5% 
3 0.222 (0.56) 
0.291c 
(0.07) 
0.096 
(0.12) 1629 0.4% 
4 -0.684
b 
(0.05) 
0.187 
(0.21) 
0.062 
(0.29) 1924 0.3% 
5 0.679 (0.18) 
0.088 
(0.75) 
0.003 
(0.96) 1601 0.1% 
6 0.217 (0.60) 
0.068 
(0.67) 
0.025 
(0.65) 2209 0.0% 
7 0.593
c 
(0.09) 
0.075 
(0.57) 
0.047 
(0.33) 2891 0.2% 
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Panel B: Regression with order imbalance of dollars, with contemporaneous order imbalances 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 δ3 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.789
b 
(0.02) 
0.206 
(0.42) 
0.048 
(0.42) 1578 0.5% 
3 0.291 (0.40) 
0.232c 
(0.10) 
0.077 
(0.17) 1629 0.3% 
4 -0.606
b 
(0.05) 
0.186 
(0.17) 
0.049 
(0.35) 1924 0.3% 
5 0.632 (0.17) 
0.096 
(0.70) 
-0.000 
(0.99) 1601 0.1% 
6 0.148 (0.69) 
0.063 
(0.65) 
0.012 
(0.82) 2209 0.0% 
7 0.551
c 
(0.08) 
0.030 
(0.80) 
0.033 
(0.45) 2891 0.1% 
 
Panel C: Regression with order imbalance of trades, with contemporaneous order imbalances 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 δ3 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 -0.043 (0.91) 
0.26 
(0.37) 
0.144 
(0.00) 1578 0.6% 
3 0.056 (0.89) 
0.257c 
(0.07) 
0.138a 
(0.01) 1629 0.7% 
4 -0.355 (0.30) 
0.173 
(0.20) 
0.068 
(0.17) 1924 0.2% 
5 -0.055 (0.99) 
0.112 
(0.65) 
0.027 
(0.63) 1601 0.0% 
6 0.211 (0.57) 
0.075 
(0.59) 
0.041 
(0.46) 2209 0.1% 
7 0.116 (0.70) 
0.054 
(0.65) 
0.066 
(0.18) 2891 0.2% 
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To check the last possibility, I divide average order imbalance size by deciles and 
calculate average earnings surprise variable. The average order imbalance is calculated 
from order imbalance data between 7 days before an announcement and 2 days before the 
announcement. Note that earnings surprise variable has range of -0.5 ~ 0.5, and 0.1 is the 
difference between two close earnings surprise deciles. Table 3 shows that earnings 
surprise variable does not have a significant pattern. Non-monotonic relation shows that 
the rank of order imbalance is not a good method to forecast an upcoming announcement. 
The difference between two extreme order imbalance deciles (Min and Max) is the 
largest for order imbalance of trades, but it is only 0.12. Using extreme values of order 
imbalance can explain just one rank difference between two close earnings surprise 
deciles. 
The simplest form of model specification would be using only signs of order 
imbalance (positive vs. negative). In table 4, difference between positive order imbalance 
and negative order imbalance is 0.05, which means the sign of order imbalance can 
explain less than one rank change of earning surprise deciles. 
One may argue that one day’s order imbalance is not an appropriate measure of 
informed trading. Kyle (1985) shows informed investors will split her orders lest her 
trading is detected by public. So I aggregate several days of order imbalance and check 
whether the aggregation can increase the predictive power of order imbalance. In table 5, 
I take 5-day moving average of order imbalance and test the relation between the moving 
average and earnings surprise. 
itjtijit
j
ji
jitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−
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Table 3 – Order imbalance size and earnings surprise 
 
For each stock, I take average order imbalance between 7 days before announcement and 2 days 
before announcement. Then I rank the average order imbalance into deciles. Following table 
shows average earnings surprise by the deciles. Earnings surprise takes values from -0.5 to 0.5. 
 
Panel A: Rank by order imbalance of shares 
Order imbalance rank Earnings surprise (Average) 
Earnings surprise 
(Std. deviation) Observations 
Low (most negative) -0.048 0.321 291 
2 -0.034 0.303 293 
3 -0.027 0.312 297 
4 -0.022 0.322 291 
5 0.009 0.320 291 
6 0.001 0.309 288 
7 0.052 0.307 301 
8 0.014 0.317 286 
9 0.031 0.317 295 
High (most positive) 0.004 0.326 292 
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Panel B: Rank by order imbalance of dollars 
Order imbalance rank Earnings surprise (Average) 
Earnings surprise 
(Std. deviation) Observations 
Low (most negative) -0.051 0.319 295 
2 -0.034 0.308 289 
3 -0.027 0.309 295 
4 -0.020 0.320 287 
5 0.006 0.322 299 
6 0.002 0.306 284 
7 0.052 0.312 299 
8 0.020 0.316 295 
9 0.026 0.317 290 
High (most positive) 0.004 0.326 292 
 
Panel C: Rank by order imbalance of trades 
Order imbalance rank Earnings surprise (Average) 
Earnings surprise 
(Std. deviation) Observations 
Low (most negative) -0.084 0.299 294 
2 -0.028 0.298 296 
3 0.014 0.316 290 
4 0.017 0.327 288 
5 -0.029 0.308 297 
6 -0.019 0.333 290 
7 0.024 0.313 289 
8 0.028 0.319 294 
9 0.019 0.321 295 
High (most positive) 0.042 0.324 292 
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Table 4 – Positive order imbalance vs. negative order imbalance 
 
For each stock, I take average order imbalance between 7 days before announcement and 2 days 
before announcement. Then I divide the average order imbalances by their signs. Following table 
shows average earnings surprise by order imbalance signs. Earnings surprise takes values from -
0.5 to 0.5. 
 
Panel A: Order imbalance of shares 
Order imbalance sign Earnings surprise (Average) 
Earnings surprise 
(Std. deviation) Observations 
Positive 0.020 0.315 1664 
Negative -0.031 0.316 1261 
 
Panel B: Order imbalance of dollars 
Order imbalance sign Earnings surprise (Average) 
Earnings surprise 
(Std. deviation) Observations 
Positive 0.021 0.315 1695 
Negative -0.033 0.316 1230 
 
Panel C: Order imbalance of trades 
Order imbalance sign Earnings surprise (Average) 
Earnings surprise 
(Std. deviation) Observations 
Positive 0.013 0.320 1688 
Negative -0.022 0.310 1237 
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Table 5 – Moving average of order imbalance and private information 
 
itjtijit
j
ji
jitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−
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−∑ 1,2
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1 )()(         (5)’’ 
 
Here I use moving average of past 5 days’ order imbalance. Earnings surprise measure v is 
derived from the difference between actual earnings and average analyst forecasts. I rank the 
earnings surprise into 11 ranks, divide it by 10, and subtract 0.5. OI is moving average of past 5 
days’ order imbalance and rt-1 is previous day’s mid-quote stock return. For every trading day, I 
use 250 prior business days of order imbalance data to estimate Kyle’s lambda. I regress stock 
return on order imbalance, and Kyle’s lambda is the coefficient. Regression method for equation 
(3) is OLS with clustering and heteroskedasticity controlled error structure. P-values are in the 
parenthesis. Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Regression with order imbalance of shares 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 1.414
b 
(0.04) 
0.222 
(0.42) 1578 0.4% 
3 0.598 (0.35) 
0.289c 
(0.07) 1629 0.2% 
4 -0.358 (0.58) 
0.188 
(0.20) 1924 0.1% 
5 0.419 (0.63) 
0.084 
(0.76) 1601 0.0% 
6 1.278
c 
(0.08) 
0.044 
(0.78) 2209 0.2% 
7 1.114
c 
(0.06) 
0.051 
(0.70) 2891 0.1% 
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Panel B: Regression with order imbalance of dollars 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 1.432
b 
(0.04) 
0.222 
(0.42) 1578 0.4% 
3 0.583 (0.37) 
0.289c 
(0.07) 1629 0.2% 
4 -0.382 (0.56) 
0.189 
(0.20) 1924 0.1% 
5 0.388 (0.66) 
0.086 
(0.76) 1601 0.0% 
6 1.269
c 
(0.09) 
0.044 
(0.78) 2209 0.2% 
7 1.100
c 
(0.06) 
0.052 
(0.69) 2891 0.1% 
 
Panel C: Regression with order imbalance of trades 
Days before announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 1.731
a 
(0.00) 
0.175 
(0.51) 1578 0.8% 
3 1.158
b 
(0.01) 
0.211 
(0.19) 1629 0.5% 
4 0.275 (0.56) 
0.172 
(0.24) 1924 0.1% 
5 0.593 (0.34) 
0.053 
(0.85) 1601 0.1% 
6 1.171
b 
(0.02) 
0.021 
(0.89) 2209 0.3% 
7 1.063
a 
(0.01) 
0.028 
(0.83) 2891 0.3% 
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Table 5 shows moving average does not significantly improve the predictive power of 
order imbalance. The average of order imbalance gains some significance at day 6 and 7, 
though. Order imbalance of trades has the highest significance, while other measures 
show significance around 10% level. So an investor who wants to use order imbalance as 
a predictor should focus on order imbalance of trades and aggregate several days of data. 
The size of coefficients is still disappointing. Significant coefficients are around 1.00. 
Since Kyle’s lambda measure have values around 0.12, this result indicates that a 
completely buy-side skewed order imbalance of 1 predicts at most a 0.1 rank higher 
earnings surprise. 
Overall, I find weak evidence that order imbalance predicts forthcoming information. 
Order imbalance may be too noisy to be used as an indicator of forthcoming information. 
 
B. Order imbalance and public information 
According to hypothesis 2, if US stock market is efficient, quote change should 
absorb the effect of earnings announcements before any trade takes in place. Then order 
imbalance should be independent of earnings surprise. 
H2: Order imbalance is independent of public announcement. 
 
To test hypothesis 2, I directly measure the correlation between order imbalance and 
earnings surprise using multiple regression. I take 3-day window around earnings 
announcement and check the relation between order imbalance and earnings surprise 
during this period. Kothari and Warner (2006) show that the power of short term event 
studies has little dependence to how researcher specifies an event return. Using raw order 
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imbalance in regression would not problematic.18
itjtijitjitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −+++ 1,21 )()(
 To compare with the result in the 
previous section, I use the same equation (5) with order imbalances after announcement 
dates. 
        (5) 
 
Table 6 has the result for equation (5). The result from order imbalance of shares or 
dollars shows that the order imbalance in general moves independent of the public 
announcement. This result implies that market makers are fast to adjust their quotes. 
Meanwhile, order imbalance of trades has some positive correlation with earnings 
announcement. 
I use a different model specification to further investigate the relation between public 
information and order imbalance. There is a possibility that the reaction of order 
imbalance around earnings announcements is correlated with other variables such as firm 
characteristics or analyst coverage. Lo and MacKinley (1990) and Brennan, Jegadeesh, 
and Swaminathan (1993) show larger firm size and higher analyst coverage is related to 
the faster speed of price discovery. Barber, Lehavy, McNicholes, Trueman (2001) find 
analysts’ EPS forecasts are positively skewed, and so stocks with many forecasts would 
have more difficulty to meet analyst forecasts. So I introduce equation (6), which uses 
order imbalance as dependent variable and includes market value and analyst coverage as 
control variables. 
 
 
                                                 
18 One can control the market-wide effect or industry effect by subtracting the average order imbalances. 
Market or industry effect controlled order imbalances yield similar results to raw order imbalance. It is 
probably because the average of multiple firms’ order imbalances often approaches to zero. 
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Table 6 – Order imbalance and public information 
 
itjtijitjitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−− 1,21 )()(         (5) 
Earnings surprise measure v is derived from the difference between actual earnings and average 
analyst forecasts. I rank the earnings surprise into 11 ranks, divide it by 10, and subtract 0.5. OI is 
order imbalance and rt-1 is previous day’s mid-quote stock return. For every trading day, I use 250 
prior business days of order imbalance data to estimate Kyle’s lambda. I regress stock return on 
order imbalance, and Kyle’s lambda is the coefficient. Regression method for equation (3) is OLS 
with clustering and heteroskedasticity controlled error structure. P-values are in the parenthesis. 
Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Regression with order imbalance of shares 
Days around announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
Previous day -0.394 (0.32) 
0.079 
(0.63) 2408 0.1% 
Announcement day 0.328 (0.36) 
0.436b 
(0.01) 2925 0.3% 
Next day 0.818
c 
(0.07) 
0.054 
(0.79) 2258 0.2% 
Panel B: Regression with order imbalance of dollars 
Days around announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
Previous day 0.874 (0.16) 
0.070 
(0.66) 2408 0.1% 
Announcement day 0.479 (0.38) 
0.442a 
(0.00) 2925 0.3% 
Next day 1.150 (0.11) 
0.032 
(0.88) 2258 0.1% 
Panel C: Regression with order imbalance of trades 
Days around announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
Previous day 0.546
b 
(0.03) 
0.076 
(0.63) 2408 0.2% 
Announcement day 0.415
c 
(0.07) 
0.437a 
(0.00) 2925 0.4% 
Next day 0.824
a 
(0.00) 
0.080 
(0.70) 2258 0.3% 
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qiqiqiqiqi analystsnumvaluemktsurpriseOI ,,3,2,1, __ εγγγα +⋅+⋅+⋅+=       (6) 
 
 ‘OI’ stands for order imbalance around the earnings announcement and ‘surprise’ 
stands for the earnings surprise. ‘OI’ is calculated by aggregating 3 day’s order 
imbalances – a day before, announcement date, and a day after. ‘Mkt_value’ is the 
monthly average market value of the firm, and it is measured 2 months before the 
announcement date. This setting is to prevent quarterly earnings announcements from 
interfering with the market value. ‘Num_analysts’ is the number of analysts who made 
EPS forecasts. The minimum of this variable is 5. Because I estimate equation (6) in 
three day period around earnings announcement, date dummies – indicating whether the 
date is before, on, or after announcement date – are in equation (6) to control the fixed 
effect. Further, to see whether stock liquidity matters, I report volume stratified result. 
The volume is average monthly volume 2 months before the announcement, and in each 
year, I rank the volume into quartiles. The estimation method is again heteroskedasticity 
and clustering controlled OLS. 
Table 7 shows that earnings surprise does not have positive and significant correlation 
with order imbalance. Order imbalance of trades seem to have a positive and significant 
correlation but it is restricted to low trading volume stocks. This result implies that in 
general the US stock market exhibits rapid quote revisions such that the market’s price 
discovery process is efficient. Quotes can offset the effect of the announcement without 
much help from trading. 
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Table 7 – Order imbalance around earnings announcements 
 
qiqiqiqiqi analystsnumvaluemktsurpriseOI ,,3,2,1, __ εγγγα +⋅+⋅+⋅+=       (6) 
 
OI stands for order imbalance of stock i at quarter q. Surprise is the ranked earnings surprise of 
stock i at quarter q. Mkt_value is the monthly average of market value, and it comes from 2 
months before the announcement. Num_analysts counts the number of analyst forecasts. Dummy 
variables are included to control the date effect – whether the date is before, on, or after earnings 
announcement date. In volume stratified result, I rank monthly average volume into quartiles. The 
monthly average volume is from 2 months before an earnings announcement. I use OLS with 
heteroskedasticity corrected errors accounting for clustering by stock or month. P-values are in 
the parenthesis. All the coefficients are multiplied by 103. Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 
10% level are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Order imbalance of shares 
 All stocks 
Volume Stratified Result 
Low volume 
stocks 
Mid-low 
volume stocks 
Mid-high 
volume stocks 
High volume 
stocks 
Surprise rank 6.008 (0.40) 
22.273 
(0.28) 
-1.982 
(0.89) 
-2.397 
(0.83) 
5.314 
(0.49) 
Market value 0.036 (0.24) 
11.807 
(0.12) 
0.400 
(0.89) 
0.531 
(0.51) 
0.025 
(0.36) 
Number of Forecasts 0.828
b 
(0.02) 
-1.780 
(0.60) 
1.505 
(0.32) 
0.582 
(0.55) 
-0.068 
(0.83) 
Observations 2923 1892 1900 1898 1895 
Adj. R-square 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 
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Panel B: Order imbalance of dollars 
 All stocks 
Volume Stratified Result 
Low volume 
stocks 
Mid-low 
volume stocks 
Mid-high 
volume stocks 
High volume 
stocks 
Surprise rank 5.703 (0.43) 
22.155 
(0.29) 
-2.162 
(0.88) 
-2.849 
(0.80) 
4.953 
(0.52) 
Market value 0.033 (0.28) 
11.337 
(0.13) 
0.258 
(0.93) 
0.470 
(0.56) 
0.022 
(0.40) 
Number of Forecasts 0.801
b 
(0.02) 
-1.763 
(0.60) 
1.484 
(0.32) 
0.557 
(0.56) 
-0.067 
(0.83) 
Observations 2923 1892 1900 1898 1895 
Adj. R-square 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 
 
Panel C: Order imbalance of trades 
 All stocks 
Volume Stratified Result 
Low volume 
stocks 
Mid-low 
volume stocks 
Mid-high 
volume stocks 
High volume 
stocks 
Surprise rank 18.635
c 
(0.07) 
57.231a 
(0.01) 
10.700 
(0.46) 
20.158 
(0.11) 
-17.035 
(0.58) 
Market value 0.082
b 
(0.05) 
11.286c 
(0.09) 
0.394 
(0.89) 
2.248b 
(0.02) 
0.094b 
(0.02) 
Number of Forecasts 1.276
a 
(0.01) 
2.166 
(0.49) 
0.606 
(0.67) 
1.221 
(0.22) 
-0.892 
(0.43) 
Observations 2923 1892 1900 1898 1895 
Adj. R-square 0.2% 0.8% 0.1% 0.7% 0.2% 
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C. Order imbalance and past information 
The results in previous two sections do not violate efficiency market hypothesis. For 
the private information case, informed investors may be effective in hiding their trades. 
For the public information case, order imbalance should be independent of the 
information lest anyone benefits from public information. In a similar vein, past 
information should have no effect on current trades. As we see in the case of public 
information, quote changes absorb the effect of the announced information. Even if 
earnings announcements are serially correlated (see Chordia and Shivakumar 2006, for 
example), earnings surprise would not be, because financial analysts will account for the 
serial correlation and adjust their earnings forecasts accordingly. 
H3: Order imbalance is independent of past announcement. 
 
I use equation (5) again to test hypothesis 3. This setting makes the results 
comparable. This time, order imbalance data is order imbalance occurring after earnings 
announcements. The estimation method is OLS with a heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustering corrected error structure. I control for clustering by firm, year, and quarter. 
itjtijitjitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−− 1,21 )()(         (5) 
 
Table 8 contains the regression results. Order imbalance starts to reflect past earnings 
surprises after the announcement. There are more days with positive and significant 
coefficients. Note that I did not change the model specification at all compared to the 
previous tests. The positive correlation between order imbalance and past information 
challenges the assumption that order imbalance captures informed trading. If the market 
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is efficient, investors would not trade based on past information. Table 9 shows the result 
with a moving average. The relation between past announcements and order imbalance 
gets stronger. Compared to the test before earnings announcements (table 5), not only 
there are more days with significant coefficients but also the coefficients are larger. This 
result suggests that investors consistently trade based on past earnings surprises. 
Of course, there can be some hidden private information after earnings 
announcements. If so, the stock return will gradually adjust to the information, and order 
imbalance may be predicting the information. To check this possibility, I test the 
correlation between order imbalance after announcement and future stock return. Indeed, 
the accounting literature finds a market anomaly that suggests this conjecture. Stocks 
with high (low) earnings surprises continue to have high (low) stock returns until the next 
earnings announcement date. This phenomenon is called as post earnings announcement 
drift (PEAD). Recent papers find several market microstructure variables are related in 
PEAD. Mendenhall (2004) shows PEAD is related to bid-ask spread, Sadka (2006) 
argues stock liquidity plays important role to PEAD, and Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) 
finds abnormal trading volume around announcement dates is linked to PEAD. Order 
imbalance could be another variable related to PEAD. 
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Table 8 – Order imbalance after earnings announcements 
 
itjtijitjitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −+++ 1,21 )()(         (5) 
 
Earnings surprise measure v is derived from the difference between actual earnings and average 
analyst forecasts. I rank the earnings surprise into 11 ranks, divide it by 10, and subtract 0.5. OI is 
order imbalance and rt-1 is previous day’s mid-quote stock return. For every trading day, I use 250 
prior business days of order imbalance data to estimate Kyle’s lambda. I regress stock return on 
order imbalance, and Kyle’s lambda is the coefficient. Regression method for equation (3) is OLS 
with clustering and heteroskedasticity controlled error structure. P-values are in the parenthesis. 
Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Regression with order imbalance of shares 
Days after announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.680 (0.16) 
0.633a 
(0.00) 1614 0.7% 
3 0.834
b 
(0.02) 
0.604a 
(0.00) 1678 0.9% 
4 0.838
b 
(0.05) 
0.119 
(0.46) 1200 0.4% 
5 0.766 (0.12) 
0.172 
(0.23) 1244 0.4% 
6 0.538 (0.16) 
0.075 
(0.46) 2350 0.1% 
7 0.856
b 
(0.01) 
0.423a 
(0.00) 2827 0.7% 
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Panel B: Regression with order imbalance of dollars 
Days after announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.678 (0.17) 
0.634a 
(0.00) 1614 0.7% 
3 0.824
b 
(0.02) 
0.605a 
(0.00) 1678 0.9% 
4 0.843
b 
(0.04) 
0.120 
(0.45) 1200 0.4% 
5 0.761 (0.12) 
0.175 
(0.23) 1244 0.4% 
6 0.530 (0.17) 
0.075 
(0.46) 2350 0.1% 
7 0.833
b 
(0.01) 
0.422a 
(0.00) 2827 0.7% 
 
Panel C: Regression with order imbalance of trades 
Days after announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.613
c 
(0.09) 
0.638a 
(0.00) 1614 0.8% 
3 0.230 (0.39) 
0.659a 
(0.00) 1678 0.7% 
4 0.557
c 
(0.05) 
0.141 
(0.39) 1200 0.4% 
5 0.655
c 
(0.05) 
0.200 
(0.17) 1244 0.5% 
6 0.388
c 
(0.10) 
0.089 
(0.38) 2350 0.1% 
7 0.809
a 
(0.00) 
0.449a 
(0.00) 2827 0.9% 
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Table 9 – Moving average of order imbalance after earnings announcements 
 
itjtijit
j
ji
jitit rOIv εδλδα +⋅+⋅⋅+= −−−
−=
−∑ 1,2
4
1 )()(         (5)’’ 
 
Earnings surprise measure v is derived from the difference between actual earnings and average 
analyst forecasts. I rank the earnings surprise into 11 ranks, divide it by 10, and subtract 0.5. OI is 
order imbalance and rt-1 is previous day’s mid-quote stock return. For every trading day, I use 250 
prior business days of order imbalance data to estimate Kyle’s lambda. I regress stock return on 
order imbalance, and Kyle’s lambda is the coefficient. Regression method for equation (3) is OLS 
with clustering and heteroskedasticity controlled error structure. P-values are in the parenthesis. 
Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Regression with order imbalance of shares 
Days after announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.368 (0.65) 
0.646a 
(0.00) 1614 0.6% 
3 0.735 (0.29) 
0.634a 
(0.00) 1678 0.7% 
4 2.230
a 
(0.00) 
0.106 
(0.47) 1200 0.9% 
5 1.567
b 
(0.03) 
0.122 
(0.42) 1244 0.5% 
6 1.681
a 
(0.01) 
0.032 
(0.76) 2350 0.3% 
7 1.978
a 
(0.00) 
0.392a 
(0.00) 2827 0.9% 
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Panel B: Regression with order imbalance of dollars 
Days after announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 0.357 (0.67) 
0.647a 
(0.00) 1614 0.6% 
3 0.723 (0.30) 
0.636a 
(0.00) 1678 0.7% 
4 2.240
a 
(0.00) 
0.106 
(0.47) 1200 0.9% 
5 1.579
b 
(0.03) 
0.123 
(0.41) 1244 0.5% 
6 1.684
a 
(0.01) 
0.034 
(0.74) 2350 0.3% 
7 1.965
a 
(0.00) 
0.391a 
(0.02) 2827 0.9% 
 
Panel C: Regression with order imbalance of trades 
Days after announcement δ1 δ2 Observations Adj. R-square 
2 1.162
b 
(0.05) 
0.599a 
(0.00) 1614 0.9% 
3 0.901
c 
(0.09) 
0.596a 
(0.00) 1678 0.8% 
4 1.636
a 
(0.00) 
0.106 
(0.46) 1200 0.9% 
5 1.655
a 
(0.00) 
0.090 
(0.55) 1244 1.0% 
6 1.636
a 
(0.00) 
0.010 
(0.92) 2350 0.6% 
7 1.645
a 
(0.00) 
0.384a 
(0.00) 2827 1.1% 
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The construction of post-earnings-announcement-drift variable follows Mendenhall 
(2004). He measures the drift by subtracting size deciles portfolio returns from 
cumulative stock returns between two earnings announcements dates. Since I use order 
imbalances up to 7 business days after the announcement, I take out overlapping days 
when calculating the PEAD. I drop an observation if the period between announcements 
is more than 120 calendar days, so that I only measure the return between quarterly 
announcements. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) after earnings announcements are 
therefore: 
)1()1( 114
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where Tq indicates the date of an earnings announcement at quarter q, r is for return 
of stock i, and EWR means equal weighted portfolio return of same size deciles in the 
CRSP file 
 
My test of the relation between order imbalance and post-earnings-announcement-
drift (PEAD) is as follows: 
qiqititqi surpriseOICAR ,,,, εθφα +⋅+⋅+=    (7) 
Equation (7) tests whether any of the order imbalances after earnings announcements 
is correlated with CAR. Small t stands for the days after announcement dates. Earnings 
surprise is included as a control variable, because PEAD was originally constructed to 
measure the correlation between CARs and earnings surprises.19
Table 10 shows order imbalance is not related to CAR. On the other hand, correlation 
between earnings surprise and CAR is robust. I reject the possibility that order imbalance 
 
                                                 
19 Due to weekends and holidays, I cannot run the equation with more than 5 days of order imbalances. 
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at earnings announcements contains some forthcoming information. The order imbalance 
after the earnings announcement is therefore acquiring its momentum from past earnings 
surprise. Thus the order imbalance pattern following a major information event can 
merely be reflecting past information. This result is inconsistent with efficient market 
hypothesis. 
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Table 10 – Order imbalance and post-earnings-announcement-drift (PEAD) 
 
qiqititqi surpriseOICAR ,,,, εθφα +⋅+⋅+=                 (7) 
 
CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return between two consecutive earnings announcements. 
OI is order imbalance after announcement and surprise is earnings surprise at the announcement. 
I use OLS with heteroskedasticity corrected errors accounting for clustering by stock or month. P-
values are in the parenthesis. Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with a, 
b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Order imbalance of shares 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 2 days) 
-0.043 
(0.26)   
-0.069 
(0.33)  
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 3 days) 
0.002 
(0.95)   
0.029 
(0.67)  
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 4 days)  
-0.005 
(0.95)  
0.38 
(0.49)  
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 5 days)  
-0.114 
(0.21)   
-0.110 
(0.14) 
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 6 days)   
0.072 
(0.05)  
0.072 
(0.32) 
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 7 days)   
0.007 
(0.84)  
0.031 
(0.66) 
Earnings surprise 0.061
a 
(0.00) 
0.144a 
(0.00) 
0.083a 
(0.00)   
Observations 933 570 1858 251 760 
Adj. R-square 1.0% 1.9% 1.0% 0.3% 0.4% 
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Panel B: Order imbalance of dollars 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 2 days) 
-0.043 
(0.27)   
-0.061 
(0.40)  
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 3 days) 
0.002 
(0.96)   
0.026 
(0.71)  
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 4 days)  
-0.010 
(0.90)  
0.32 
(0.57)  
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 5 days)  
-0.102 
(0.25)   
-0.100 
(0.18) 
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 6 days)   
0.073b 
(0.04)  
0.071 
(0.33) 
Order Imbalance 
(announcement + 7 days)   
0.008 
(0.82)  
0.033 
(0.63) 
Earnings surprise 0.061
a 
(0.00) 
0.144a 
(0.00) 
0.083a 
(0.00)   
Observations 933 570 1858 251 760 
Adj. R-square 1.0% 1.8% 1.1% 0.5% 0.3% 
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D. Order imbalance and stock return 
Previous section suggests that some order imbalances may not be related to 
information. Market makers may be reluctant to change her quote level if order 
imbalances seem to be reflecting past information. Then order imbalances before 
earnings announcement can have smaller effect to stock returns compared to order 
imbalances after the announcement. On the other hand, it can be hard for market makers 
to differentiate order flows by their probability of informed trading. Market makers may 
take a simple approach and change their quote level according to all order imbalances. In 
this case, stock returns will be equally sensitive to any types of order imbalances. 
I test whether order imbalances before earnings announcements have bigger effect on 
stock returns compared to order imbalances after earnings announcements. This test will 
show which type of order imbalance – information related or not – is more important to 
stock price change. Following Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), I include lagged order 
imbalances in the test equation: 
qi
j
jtijti OIr ,
5
0
,, εγα +⋅+= ∑
=
−                            (8) 
where rit is daily mid-quote stock return of stock i at day t and OIit is daily 
order imbalance of stock i at day t-j 
 
Equation (8) tests the effect of contemporary and lagged order imbalances to stock 
return. I divide my dataset into two groups: stock returns before earnings announcements 
and stock returns after earnings announcements. The former dataset has stock returns 
between [-8, -1] days of earnings announcements and the latter dataset has stock returns 
between [6, 13] days of earnings announcements. The latter dataset has returns past 6 
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business days of earnings announcements to prevent using order imbalances before 
earnings announcements in the estimation. 
Table 11 shows two types of order imbalance have similar effect to stock returns. 
Order imbalances after earnings announcements have slightly higher R-square and larger 
coefficients. This result indicates that non-information based order flows can equally 
move stock prices as information based order flows. Such effect can make price 
discovery processes more difficult and time consuming. 
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Table 11 – Order imbalance and stock return 
 
qi
j
jtijti OIr ,
5
0
,, εγα +⋅+= ∑
=
−                        (8) 
 
 
rit is daily mid-quote stock return of stock i at day t and OIit is daily order imbalance of stock i at 
day t-j. I divide my dataset into two groups: stock returns before earnings announcements and 
stock returns after earnings announcements. The former dataset has stock returns between [-8, -1] 
days of announcements and the latter dataset has stock returns between [6, 13] days of 
announcements. I use OLS with heteroskedasticity corrected errors accounting for clustering by 
stock or month. P-values are in the parenthesis. Coefficients significant in 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
are marked with a, b, and c. 
 
Panel A: Order imbalances before earnings announcements 
 Order imbalance of shares Order imbalance of dollars Order imbalance of trades 
Order Imbalancet 
0.044a 
(0.00) 
0.044a 
(0.00) 
0.052a 
(0.00) 
Order Imbalancet-1 
0.015a 
(0.00) 
0.015a 
(0.00) 
0.026a 
(0.00) 
Order Imbalancet-2 
-0.012a 
(0.00) 
-0.012a 
(0.00) 
-0.016a 
(0.00) 
Order Imbalancet-3 
-0.008a 
(0.00) 
-0.007a 
(0.00) 
-0.009a 
(0.00) 
Order Imbalancet-4 
-0.005b 
(0.01) 
-0.005b 
(0.01) 
-0.004c 
(0.06) 
Order Imbalancet-5 
-0.005b 
(0.01) 
-0.005b 
(0.01) 
-0.010a 
(0.00) 
Observations 11797 11797 11797 
Adj. R-square 4.4% 4.4% 8.2% 
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Panel B: Order imbalances after earnings announcements 
 Order imbalance of shares Order imbalance of dollars Order imbalance of trades 
Order Imbalancet 
0.052a 
(0.00) 
0.052a 
(0.00) 
0.054a 
(0.00) 
Order Imbalancet-1 
0.022a 
(0.00) 
0.022a 
(0.00) 
0.028a 
(0.00) 
Order Imbalancet-2 
-0.012a 
(0.00) 
-0.012a 
(0.00) 
-0.018a 
(0.00) 
Order Imbalancet-3 
-0.002 
(0.30) 
-0.002 
(0.29) 
-0.001 
(0.85) 
Order Imbalancet-4 
-0.004b 
(0.03) 
-0.004b 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.82) 
Order Imbalancet-5 
-0.002 
(0.38) 
-0.002 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.80) 
Observations 11439 11439 11439 
Adj. R-square 4.8% 4.8% 8.3% 
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V. Conclusion 
Order imbalance may signal underlying information, and it can be a powerful 
supplement to the signals from stock returns or trading volume. However, its relation 
with information has not been thoroughly investigated. In order to use order imbalance in 
future applications, there should be more studies of its characteristics. 
I empirically test the relation between order imbalance and information using 
earnings announcements as my information source. Before an earnings announcement, 
order imbalance has poor predictive power for the subsequently released earnings 
announcements. There are two explanations for this result; one is that informed investors 
are successful in hiding their trades and the other is that order imbalance moves 
independently of information. The former explanation is consistent with weak form 
market efficiency hypothesis that past data cannot predict an upcoming event. 
When information is publicly announced, the order imbalance at announcement 
period moves independently of the released information. This independence is consistent 
with semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis, that no investor should be able to 
make a profit from public information. The finding of independence is evidence that 
market makers quickly change their quotes to reflect the information before trades take in 
place. 
Meanwhile, order imbalances after earnings announcements have a positive 
correlation with past earnings surprises. It is a puzzle why order imbalance is independent 
of information arriving at the announcement, but gains positive correlation afterwards. 
While the efficient market hypothesis is supported by the two earlier results, the relation 
between past information and order imbalance is inconsistent with efficient market 
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hypothesis. I verify that order imbalances after announcement does not contain other 
information, but related to past earnings surprises. However, order imbalances after 
earnings announcements have similar effect to stock returns compared to that of order 
imbalances before announcements. This result indicates that non-information based order 
imbalances can have a significant effect to stock returns. 
Overall, my results do not support the assumption that order imbalance is connected 
to informed trading. A framework that explains all three behavior patterns in order 
imbalance in this paper is yet to be developed. Thus, this evidence calls for additional 
research on the determinants of order imbalance, a variable that has potential to aid the 
investment decisions of many investors. 
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Appendix – The Construction of Order Imbalance Data 
 
1. Criteria for stock selection are: 
• Data source comes from Trade and Quote (TAQ) data. 
• Data period is from January 1996 to December 2004. 
• I exclude Certificates, ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, units, Americus Trust 
components, closed-end funds, preferred stocks and REITs from the dataset. 
• I delete the stock is from the sample year if the price at any month-end during the 
year was greater than $999. 
• I eliminate non-synchronous trading issue by marking stock return as missing if 
there was no trade on today or previous day. 
 
2. When constructing order imbalance variable, I only use quotes and trades such that:  
• Quotes and trades are in regular market trading times (from 9:30 to 16:00) 
• There is no special settlement conditions 
• All bid-ask spreads are positive 
 
3. Method to calculate order imbalance is (Lee and Ready (1991) method): 
• A trade is buyer (seller) initiated if it is closer to the ask (bid) of the prevailing 
quote.  
• Prevailing quote should be at least 5 seconds old. 
If the trade is at the midpoint of the quote, the trade is buyer (seller) initiated if prior 
stock price change was positive (negative). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ORDER IMBALANCE AROUND SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS 
 
I. Introduction 
A seasoned equity offering (SEO) can create large order imbalances – buying 
pressure or selling pressure – around its issue date. An analysis of the trading pattern 
would be useful in understanding equity flotation cost, because the pattern shows how 
SEO characteristics affect stock trading activity in nearby periods. This paper studies 
stock order imbalance around an SEO and its relation to SEO underpricing. 
There are many hypotheses on the observed trading pattern around SEOs, but most of 
them are tested using stock return data, rather than order imbalance information. Since 
stock price can change because of quote level changes as well as trading pressure, stock 
returns fail to give a clear picture of the role of trading pressure around SEOs. I use Lee 
and Ready (1992) method to directly estimate buying pressure / selling pressure around 
an SEO issue date and examine how order flow is related to major SEO characteristics 
including underpricing. 
Analysis of order imbalances around security offerings is more common in the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) literature than the SEO literature. (Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara 
2004, Aggarwal 2000, Boehmer and Fische 2003, and Lewellen 2006 for example) Many 
papers use proprietary data on institutional trading after an IPO. Ellis, Michaely, and 
O’Hara (2004) study market making activities after an IPO. The relation between price 
supports and trading patterns is investigated in Aggarwal (2000), Boehmer and Fische 
(2003), and Lewellen (2006). Meanwhile, the order imbalance of an SEO is first studied 
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in Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) and revisited by Huh and Subrahmanyam (2005). 
Cotter, Chen, and Kao (2004) analyze trading data to detect price stabilization activity 
around SEOs, while Autore (2007) and Henry and Koski (2008) study relation between 
short selling activity and stock price movements around an SEO. Order imbalance 
measure allows a researcher to capture abnormal trading patterns without using 
proprietary data, and so it can be useful to analyze SEOs. To my knowledge, this paper is 
the first attempt to analyze the relation between order imbalance and SEO characteristics, 
such as underpricing. 
Indeed, order imbalance pattern is quite different from stock return pattern. SEO 
papers find negative stock returns before an issue date and positive returns afterwards. 
(see Kadlec, Loderer, and Sheehan 1994, Corwin 2003, and Meidan 2005 for example) 
Meanwhile, I find that order imbalance is slightly positive before an issue date and highly 
negative afterwards. This result is surprising because it is known that order imbalance 
and stock return moves to the same direction (Chordia and Subrahmanyam 2004). Huh 
and Subrahmanyam (2005) show that order imbalance and stock return shows negative 
correlation after an SEO issue date. Such inconsistency between trading pattern and stock 
return calls for in depth study on order imbalance around SEOs. 
Based on the existing literature, I test five factors that may affect trading patterns 
around an SEO issue date. (1) Selling incentives generated by arbitrage seeking and 
supply shock, (2) Information asymmetry and uncertainty about SEO details, (3) 
Underwriter price support after post-SEO issuance, (4) Flipping activities20
                                                 
20 Flipping indicates acquiring the stocks in offering and selling them right after the issue date. 
, and (5) 
Market maker inventory management around SEOs. These factors give different 
predictions about order imbalance patterns and their effects on SEO underpricing. I study 
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which factors drive trading activities around SEO issue dates, and how they are related to 
SEO underpricing and equity flotation costs more generally. 
I find that positive order imbalances before an issue date can be explained by market 
maker inventory management. The positive order imbalance is generated by market 
makers lowering quotes to promote ask side transactions. More ask side transactions 
reduce market makers’ inventory level before an SEO. As shown in Stoll (1978), the 
trading activities of market makers have little effect on stock price, because quotes should 
not be far away from current market price to promote bid side transactions. 
If other types of investors engaged in selling activities before an SEO, there would be 
more bid side transactions, causing negative order imbalance. My test further confirms 
that the trading pattern is not affected by other SEO characteristics such as offer size or 
the downward slope of demand curve. This result implies that there are not excessive 
selling activities before SEO issue dates those which can push the price down. 
Highly negative order imbalance after an issue date can be explained by underwriters’ 
price support. Underwriters place limit orders at the bid to prevent the stock price from 
dropping below the offer price. As the price support gets stronger, there are more bid side 
transactions than ask side transactions, which will be measured as a negative order 
imbalance. I find that order imbalance following SEOs are negatively correlated with 
offer size and underwriter reputation. Also, order imbalances become more negative as 
the current market price drops below the offer price. These results indicate that price 
support activity is stronger when offer size is larger, underwriter reputation is stronger, 
and when the stock’s market price drops below the offer price. 
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I find evidence that trading pressure can affect equity flotation cost. SEO 
underpricing is significantly correlated with order imbalance at the issue date. The 
correlation is significant, even after controlling for endogeneity and other known factors 
related to underpricing. This result implies that (1) trading pressure around an SEO can 
be an important factor that affects equity flotation cost, and (2) large underwriters can 
change the degree of underpricing by temporarily moving the stock’s market price. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, this paper shows that the 
trading patterns around an SEO are based on different economic mechanisms than that of 
stock returns. While price pressure and information asymmetry / uncertainty may be 
powerful hypotheses on stock return movement (see Corwin 2003), a stock’s trading 
pattern is little affected by those factors. This paper shows that the trading patterns 
around an SEO are dominated by underwriters’ price support activity and market makers’ 
inventory adjustments. This evidence can be useful to SEO underwriters, traders, and 
regulators. Second, this paper shows that trading pressure can affect SEO underpricing. 
While underpricing is a major component of flotation costs, underwriters can reduce this 
issuer cost through their trading activity. Underwriters may even choose to short sell an 
SEO stock in order to impose a stronger price support (Henry and Koski 2008). In such 
cases, underpricing measures can convey a misleading signal to issuing firms about the 
success of its underwriter’s advisory and selling activities. 
The rest of paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 discusses hypotheses on trading 
pressure around an SEO. Section 3 describes order imbalance measure and SEO data. 
Section 4 shows how order imbalance is correlated with the factors of SEO. Section 5 
studies relation between order imbalance and SEO underpricing. Section 6 concludes. 
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II. Hypotheses on Order imbalance around an SEO 
 
A. Selling incentives 
   An SEO generates selling incentives to majority of traders. First, the offer price is 
usually lower than the market price. Gerard and Nanda (1993) show that this price 
difference creates an arbitrage opportunity for traders. Traders can short sell an SEO 
stock before an issue date and recover the position in primary market. Since this activity 
can push down the offer price further and discourage firms from issuing new shares, the 
SEC imposes restrictions on covering short selling position using newly offered shares.21
SEOs create another selling incentive, because they supply a large amount of shares 
to the market. The supply shock generates a temporary downward price pressure (see 
Kraus and Stoll 1972 for example), and traders may want to sell the stocks before they 
experience this downward price pressure effect. Some studies use stock return around an 
 
Still, traders who can cover their short position elsewhere can short sell an SEO stock. 
Even underwriters can short sell before an issue date to control their exposure. Existing 
shareholders may also temporarily reduce their position in order to gain some short-term 
profit. There is still a ongoing debate on the effect of selling activity. Safieddine and 
Wilhelm (1996) find short selling restriction (SEC rule 10b-21) reduces underpricing, 
while Corwin (2003) and Kim and Shin (2004) argue the effect is marginal. Henry and 
Koski (2008) show short selling activity can cause a temporary price drop around an SEO 
issue date. 
                                                 
21 From 1988, SEC imposed Rule 10b-21, which prohibits covering short sales with shares from primary market. Rule 
10b-21 applies to any short sales from announcement date to issue date. In 1997, SEC changed replaced Rule 10b-21 
with Rule 105. Rule 105 prohibits short covering with shares from primary market, if short sales position is made 
within 5 days of issue date. 
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SEO as the evidence of price pressure. Kadlec, Loderer, and Sheehan (1994) and Meidan 
(2005) find stock returns are negative before the issue date and positive afterwards. 
Furthermore, Corwin (2003) shows SEO underpricing is increasing in offer size. 
Meanwhile, the stock return data of Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) does not fit the price 
pressure hypothesis. Scholes (1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) find no correlation 
between offer size and price movements around the SEO issue date. They argue that in an 
efficient market, price pressure effect should be reflected in announcement dates rather 
than issue dates. In short, this remains a controversial area of research and motivates my 
analysis of trading patterns around an SEO issue date. 
If trading patterns are dominated by the above mentioned selling incentives, order 
imbalances will show the following patterns. First, order imbalance should be negative 
before an issue date and positive afterwards. This prediction follows from the assumption 
that traders are selling the stock before an issue date, much like front running. Second, 
order imbalance before an issue date should be more negative as offer size increases. A 
larger offer size means more opportunities for short selling and greater price pressure. 
Third, order imbalance before and after an issue date should be similar in their size 
effects, but with opposite signs, because an SEO generates temporary selling incentives. 
Lastly, SEO underpricing should be negatively correlated with order imbalance. If those 
selling activities cause SEO underpricing, the degree of underpricing should be 
decreasing as order imbalance becomes less negative. 
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B. Uncertainty and information asymmetry 
Since Myers and Majluf (1984), numerous papers confirmed that uncertainty and 
information asymmetry have an important bearing on the equity offering process. 
However, there can be two types of uncertainty and information asymmetry related to an 
SEO. Myers and Majluf (1984) theory focuses on manager’s decision to issue equity. The 
effect should negatively affect stock price at an announcement date. I plot average order 
imbalance around SEO announcement dates in figure 1. 
Figure 1 shows SEO announcement has insignificant effect to trading patterns. 
Average order imbalance is not highly negative around SEO announcement dates. 
Although SEO announcement may be a bad news, order imbalance may not be negative 
if quotes move fast enough to offset the announcement effect. 
Since the actual offer size and offer price decisions are determined near the offer date, 
relatively un-informed investors can be reluctant to trade the stock before an issue date, 
given this increased uncertainty and information disadvantage.. In similar vein, 
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996), Corwin (2003), Altinkinc and Hansen (2003) find 
uncertainty and information asymmetry affect SEO underpricing. They find that stocks 
with a higher degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry have a larger 
underpricing. Underpricing can be a result of setting conservative offer prices, but it also 
can be exacerbated by selling activities preceding the SEO issue date. Using order 
imbalance, we can test whether uncertainty and information asymmetry generates more 
selling activities before an SEO issue date. 
 
 113 
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-5
 d
ay
-4
 d
ay
-3
 d
ay
-2
 d
ay
-1
 d
ay
An
no
un
ce
m
en
t
+1
 d
ay
+2
 d
ay
+3
 d
ay
+4
 d
ay
+5
 d
ay
 
 Average order imbalance higher or lower than dotted band is significant in 10% 
level. 
 
Figure 1 – Order imbalance around an SEO announcement date 
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If uncertainty and information asymmetry before an issue date reduce investor 
demand for shares, then we would predict to observe negative order imbalance before 
SEO issue dates. The degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry should be 
negatively correlated with order imbalances prior to the SEO issue dates. If uncertainty 
and information asymmetry affects SEO underpricing through trading activities, then 
order imbalances should be negatively correlated with SEO underpricing. Uncertainty 
and information asymmetry before an issue date can reduce buying activities of traders. 
So this explanation predicts a negative order imbalance before an issue date. The degree 
of uncertainty and information asymmetry should be negatively correlated with order 
imbalance before an issue date. If uncertainty and information asymmetry affects SEO 
underpricing through trading activities, the order imbalance should be negatively 
correlated with SEO underpricing. 
 
C. Underwriter price support 
IPO studies such as Aggarwal (2000), Boehmer and Fishe (2003), and Lewellen 
(2006) find underwriters undertake considerable amounts of price support activity. 
Underwriters have the same incentive to support SEO stock prices. However, price 
support of SEO stocks is more complicated because of the typically larger trading volume 
in the secondary market post-SEO. It is also harder for a researcher to detect price 
support activity by studying stock return patterns, while order imbalances can more 
directly measure the degree of price support activity.  
Price support activity is undertaken by placing large limit orders to buy stock. If 
underwriters place larger limit orders, then more traders can take advantage of this 
 115 
opportunity to sell shares at better prices. On the other hand, investors interested in 
buying shares would delay placing orders because the current quote levels are higher than 
the stock’s intrinsic value due to the temporary underwriter price support activity. Thus, 
stronger price supports generate more buy side trading, resulting in negative order 
imbalances. Similarly, Cotter, Chen, and Kao (2004) argue that price stabilization trading 
occurs at bid. They also show that price stabilization gets stronger when market price 
falls below offer price. 
In general, price support activity begins on the SEO issue date and can continue for a 
number of trading days thereafter. Therefore, price supports create negative order 
imbalances following SEO issue dates, while they have little known effect on order 
imbalances prior to the issue dates. Because the main purpose of price supports is to 
reduce underpricing, order imbalances should have a positive correlation with 
underpricing. More negative order imbalance would be a sign that underwriters are 
undertaking greater levels of price supports to reduce underpricing. 
 
D. Flipping 
   Institutional investors who acquired shares in offering may sell the shares after an 
issue date. This type of sales is called as ‘flipping’. Since offer price is typically lower 
than market price, institutional investors can sell their SEO shares in the secondary 
market at a higher price. This activity can give a short term profit. On the other hand, 
issuing firm and underwriters try to prevent flipping because it can signal sour views of 
future performance. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) find the degree of flipping 
activity is a predictor of future stock performance. Given the incentives for flipping, there 
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is possibility that flipping generates a large selling pressure after an issue date. However, 
Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2007) argue flipping activities are rare in SEOs. They find 
about 3% of SEO shares are flipped. 
I test whether flipping generates a significant selling pressure after an issue date. If 
flipping is a major determinant of trading activity around an SEO, we should observe 
following patterns: First, order imbalance should be negative after an issue date. Second, 
there will be positive correlation between order imbalance and underwriter reputation. 
Flipping harms post SEO stock performance and signals poor prospects, but better 
underwriters would reduce those effects. A higher underwriter reputation will push order 
imbalance toward positive side. Third, since flipping is profitable when secondary market 
price is higher than offer price, order imbalance would be more negative when current 
market price is higher than offer price. Lastly, order imbalance would be positively 
correlated with underpricing. Flipping creates negative order imbalance as well as lower 
stock return, so order imbalance and stock return should go in a same direction. Note that 
flipping hypothesis gives a similar prediction to underwriter price support hypothesis, 
except for the opposite effect of underwriter reputation and current market price. 
 
E. Market maker inventory management 
Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) find that there are positive order imbalances before 
an SEO issue date. They explain this phenomenon by market maker inventory 
management. Since an SEO can induce large selling pressure in the secondary market as 
of the issue date, market maker inventory can significantly increase after an SEO. As in 
Stoll (1978), market makers have incentives to keep a constant inventory level, and so 
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anticipating future selling pressure they would try to reduce their inventory levels before 
an SEO issue date. In order to reduce their inventory level, market makers purposely 
place their quote level below market price. If a quote level is below the share’s usual 
price level, then buyers would want to trade, while sellers would stay away, generating a 
positive order imbalance. A positive order imbalance reduces market maker inventory 
because buyers can obtain stock from market makers. This type of trading can also yield 
short term profits for market makers. By changing quote levels in advance of SEO issue 
dates, market makers are effectively following a short selling strategy. They reduce 
inventory (sell shares to public) before an issue date and restore it to its ordinary level 
afterwards. The difference between ordinary selling and inventory management 
represents its effect on order imbalance. Ordinary selling creates a negative order 
imbalance, while inventory management generates a positive order imbalance. 
If order imbalance follows market maker inventory management, there will be a 
positive order imbalance before an SEO issue date. A negative order imbalance may 
follow afterwards, but market makers also have option to buy shares in the primary 
market. The effect of order imbalance on underpricing can be marginal, because the order 
imbalance is generated by a temporary quote change rather than a permanent price 
change. As in Stoll (1978), market makers can reduce their inventory level only when 
price stays higher than quote level. Table 1 summarizes five factors and their predictions 
for order imbalance patterns. Because these factors provide different predictions, we can 
see which explanation fits the best by analyzing order imbalance pattern. 
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Table 1 – Hypotheses and predictions on order imbalance 
 
This table shows predictions on order imbalance patterns around an SEO issue date. 
   Hypotheses: 
1. Price pressure: The supply shock of an SEO creates a temporary downward selling 
pressure to a stock 
2. Uncertainty and Information asymmetry: Uncertainty and information asymmetry of 
an SEO keep buyers from trading the stock before its issue date 
3. Price support: Underwriters place large limit orders at bid after an issue date 
4. Flipping: Institutional investors acquire shares in primary market and sell the shares 
in secondary market 
5. Market maker inventory management: Market makers drop their quote level before 
an SEO issue date to reduce their inventory level 
 
 Before an issue date 
At an issue 
date 
After an issue 
date 
Overall change 
by an SEO 
Correlation 
with 
underpricing 
Selling incentives Negative Negative Positive Little change Negative correlation 
Uncertainty and 
Information asymmetry Negative    
Positive 
correlation 
Underwriter price support  Negative Negative Negative Positive correlation 
Flipping   Negative Negative Positive correlation 
Market maker inventory 
management Positive Negative Negative Little change 
Little 
correlation 
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III. Data 
 
A. Data 
   I use Trade and Quote (TAQ) data for ordinary common shares from 1996 to 2004 to 
construct my order imbalance dataset. The construction method is in appendix, and it 
closely follows the method of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002). Their method is 
based on Lee and Ready (1991), but it imposes additional filters to reduce problems from 
scarce trading. The basic idea of the method is to count the number of shares traded at ask 
side (buy side orders) and bid side (sell side orders) every day. Subtracting shares traded 
at bid side from shares traded at ask side, I get a daily measure on order imbalance. For 
example, if there are more shares traded at ask side than bid side, there is a positive order 
imbalance at that day. Lee and Ready (1991), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002), 
and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) show this method gives an effective measure of 
daily price pressure. 
I measure order imbalance in numbers of shares. If order imbalances are measured in 
number of trades or dollar volume, I find qualitatively similar results. I divide the share 
imbalance measure by total shares outstanding (excluding new shares to be issued) to 
normalized the price pressure measure. This metric facilitates a cross-sectional 
comparison across the sample of stocks with SEOs. 
   Seasoned equity offering data is extracted from SDC database. To be included in the 
dataset, a security offering must pass the following filters: 
• The offer should be a public offer for a US common stock. 
• Rights offerings and shelf offerings are excluded. 
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• Offer price should be more than $5 per share.  
• Primary listing of the stock is NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.  
• Close-end funds/trusts, limited partnerships, LBO firms, firms with previous 
LBOs, private placements, unit investment trusts, unit issues, simultaneous 
offerings, and simultaneous international offerings are excluded. 
• An issuer should be a US company. 
• REITs and equity spinoffs are excluded. 
 
Additionally, I use the CRSP and Market Microstructure databases available at 
Vanderbilt University to get stock price data and market microstructure data. The final 
dataset contains 1096 seasoned equity offerings. 
   Many papers including Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) point out that the issue date 
in the SDC database is not very accurate. The problematic cases are offerings launched 
after the close of stock market trading. For these cases, a researcher should use the data of 
the next business day. I use the method of Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) to pick out the 
actual SEO event date. Their method uses the trading volume surge on the effective issue 
date around the SEO to identify it. If the next day of an SDC issue date has more than 
twice the volume of the SDC issue date, and if its volume is more than twice the average 
daily volume of the previous 250 days, I mark the next day as actual issue date. Corwin 
(2003) uses the same method, and Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) documents that this 
method has a high accuracy level. 
   Table 2 shows some basic statistics about the SEO sample. 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics of order imbalances 
 
I report summary statistics for SEO characteristics in the dataset. My SEO data contains 1,096 
SEOs during 1996 ~ 2004 period. Issuer stock volume is monthly average trading volume 
measured 6 months from the issue date. I also show SEO sample periods of a few other SEO 
studies. 
Year Obs. Statistic 
Shares Filed Amount Filed Issuer Market Value 
Issuer Stock 
Trading Volume 
(Million shares) (Million $) (Million $) (Million shares) 
1996 11 
Mean 2.5 70.7 538.3 12.1 
Median 1.9 34.0 225.1 11.4 
1997 138 
Mean 4.0 112.5 428.7 8.1 
Median 2.7 62.4 162.7 4.3 
1998 58 
Mean 8.4 229.8 1428.7 20.5 
Median 3.1 73.4 212.1 8.2 
1999 99 
Mean 6.7 287.8 2476.9 33.9 
Median 3.0 100.0 202.5 10.5 
2000 73 
Mean 10.3 281.7 2181.9 28.0 
Median 3.8 113.5 474.6 12.9 
2001 165 
Mean 20.9 550.16 2507.5 59.0 
Median 4.3 106.6 503.0 15.6 
2002 111 
Mean 9.6 247.2 2360.0 46.0 
Median 5.0 106.6 809.7 21.7 
2003 309 
Mean 6.9 158.6 2193.3 61.4 
Median 5.0 89.4 430.0 18.4 
2004 132 
Mean 5.8 144.3 1454.0 35.6 
Median 4.0 93.9 540.3 18.8 
Total 1096 
Mean 9.0 241.8 1914.0 42.3 
Median 
4.0 88.3 402.1 13.1 
 
 122 
SEO Paper Sample period 
Altinklic and Hansen (2003) 1990 ~ 1997 
Altinklic and Hansen (2006) 1985 ~ 2001 
Corwin (2003) 1980 ~ 1998 
Cotter, Chen, and Kao (2004) 1997 ~ 1998 
Meidan (2005) 1993 ~ 2002 
Mola and Loughran (2004) 1986 ~ 1999 
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) 1980 ~ 1991 
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IV. Order Imbalance around an SEO Issue Date 
 
A. Order imbalance and stock return 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of daily order imbalances and stock returns 
around SEO issue dates. Order imbalance is normalized by the number of shares 
outstanding before an SEO and daily stock returns are calculated as a percentage of 
closing bid-ask mid-points. Figure 2 plots daily order imbalances and stock returns 
around SEO issue dates. 
For this sample, stocks have average daily order imbalance of 0.080 and the standard 
deviation of the average is 0.378. Order imbalances in [-1, 2] event window around an 
issue date are particularly significant. The price pressure pattern shows that there is 
buying pressure before an issue date and selling pressure afterwards. The positive order 
imbalance before an issue date is consistent with market maker inventory management 
hypothesis. Market makers lower their quotes to reduce their inventory level before an 
SEO. However, we can see that order imbalance does not move solely by inventory 
management because the size of selling pressure after an issue date is much larger than 
that of previous buying pressure. Observing large selling pressure after SEO issue dates is 
consistent with price support hypothesis and flipping hypothesis. The former states that 
underwriters are placing a large limit orders to buy near the offer price, and latter states 
that institutional investors are selling their allocated stocks. We will be able to 
differentiate two explanations later using regressions. 
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Figure 2 – Order imbalance and stock return around an SEO issue date 
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Table 3 – Summary statistics of order imbalances 
 
I report summary statistics for order imbalance and stock return around an SEO issue date. Order 
imbalance is normalized by the number of shares outstanding before an SEO, and stock return is 
calculated using bid-ask mid-point prices. Order imbalance measures are multiplied by 1000 for 
visual convenience. Plus or minus indicates business days from an SEO issue date. In my data, 
average daily order imbalance is 0.080 and standard deviation of the average is 0.378. The mean 
order imbalances significant in 1% level are marked with small a, the coefficients significant in 
5% level are marked with small b, and the coefficients significant in 10% level are marked with 
small c. 
 
Panel A: Order Imbalance 
 Day - 4 Day – 3 Day - 2 Day - 1 Issue D Day + 1 Day + 2 Day + 3 Day + 4 
Mean 0.35 0.45 0.60 0.80c -3.44a -5.15a -0.75b -0.35 -0.21 
Median 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.39 0.32 -1.59 -0.09 -0.02 0.08 
STD 3.14 3.00 3.31 3.56 20.69 23.07 6.14 4.84 7.17 
Panel B: Mid-quote Stock Return 
 Day - 4 Day - 3 Day - 2 Day - 1 Issue D Day + 1 Day + 2 Day + 3 Day + 4 
Mean -0.17% -0.26% -0.20% -0.43% -0.94% -0.18% 0.55% 0.28% 0.23% 
Median -0.14% -0.17% -0.13% -0.19% -0.64% -0.09% 0.28% 0.17% 0.16% 
STD 4.28% 4.13% 4.04% 4.69% 4.47% 4.20% 2.81% 2.49% 2.70% 
Panel C: Correlation between Order imbalance and Mid-quote Stock Return 
 Day - 4 Day - 3 Day - 2 Day - 1 Issue D Day + 1 Day + 2 Day + 3 Day + 4 
Coefficient 2.33 2.50 2.51 1.39 0.40 0.45 1.16 1.33 1.70 
t-value 5.67 5.95 6.92 3.46 5.99 7.67 8.12 8.49 9.32 
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The pattern of order imbalances is inconsistent with the predictions of both the selling 
incentives and the uncertainty / information asymmetry hypotheses, while the stock 
returns evidence is consistent with predictions of both hypotheses. This evidence suggests 
that shares prices can move without trading pressure (i.e. price jumps to a new level 
without much trading), or that the effects of two hypotheses are dominated by market 
maker trading, underwriter price support, and flipping hypotheses. 
While the correlations between order imbalances and stock returns should always be 
positive and significant, there are days with positive order imbalances and negative stock 
returns. We can also see that while order imbalances generally push stock returns in the 
same direction, stock returns can move without any large trading pressures. One 
implication of this result is that stock returns do not always reflect overall trading patterns. 
 
B. Determinants of order imbalance 
Since order imbalance can be affected by multiple factors, I use standard regression 
techniques to identify the determinants of order imbalances and then select variables to 
test the predictions of each of the five main hypothesis. 
 
Selling incentives related variables: 
 Offer size: Corwin (2003) argues that the correlation between offer size and 
underpricing is evidence of price pressure. Since he measures underpricing by 
the difference between the offer price and the closing price on the trading day 
before the issue date, his logic implies that more investors are willing to sell 
stocks because of the forthcoming supply shock. So order imbalance before an 
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issue date should be more negative as offering size (the size of supply shock) 
increases. Also, a larger offer size indicates greater opportunities for arbitrage, 
which starts by short selling the SEO stock prior to the issuance date. Offer size 
is defined as shares offered divided by the number of shares outstanding before 
an SEO.22
 Kyle’s lambda: Kyle’s lambda is a sensitivity of a stock to buying or selling 
pressure. The sensitivity is estimated by regressing stock returns on share order 
imbalances. The estimation period is 1 year, and I use the sensitivity of 6 months 
before the issue date. Like offering size, order imbalance would be decreasing in 
Kyle’s lambda. 
 
 
Uncertainty and information asymmetry related variables: 
 Idiosyncratic risk: Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2006) suggest that 
information asymmetry can be measured by a stock’s idiosyncratic risk, while 
uncertainty can be represented by stock return volatility. I estimate idiosyncratic 
risk by regressing daily stock returns on the value weighted market returns taken 
from the CRSP database. The estimation period is the 6 months prior to the issue 
date. Cross-sectionally idiosyncratic risk should be negatively correlated with 
order imbalances prior to the SEO issue date, because information asymmetry 
will keep buyers from buying SEO stocks. After the issue date, order imbalances 
may increase in idiosyncratic risk because buyers return to market once the 
information asymmetry is resolved. 
                                                 
22 Average stock volume can be an alternative normalizing variable. I find no difference in test results by switching the 
normalizing variable. 
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 Stock volatility: Uncertainty is measured by standard deviation of stock return. 
The estimation period that used in estimating idiosyncratic risk. Cross- 
sectionally, volatility should have the same correlation with order imbalances as 
idiosyncratic risk. 
 Underwriter reputation: Almost every IPO and SEO study finds that underwriter 
reputation reduces underpricing (Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli 2007). This result is 
used as evidence that better underwriters reduce information asymmetry and 
uncertainty of an equity offering. I follow Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) in 
measuring underwriter reputation. I measure the market share of the seasoned 
equity offerings of each investment bank and rank it into 10 categories from 
worst to best (1 ~ 10). The underwriter reputation is the rank of its market share 
in SEO and IPO underwritings in the prior year. If an underwriter had no 
underwritings in the prior year, it receives a 0 value. One problem with the 
ranking variable is that it is positively skewed. Following Bernard and Thomas 
(1990) and Mendenhall (2004), the raw rank is divided by 10 and then 0.5 is 
subtracted to shift the midpoint of the variable to zero. 
 Information risk: Bid-ask spread is often used as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that spread is increasing in the 
probability of informed trading. However, Stoll (2000) document that quoted 
bid-ask spread contains components of information asymmetry, market maker 
inventory risk, and real frictions. He shows that information asymmetry can be 
measured by the difference between quoted spread and traded spread. Traded 
spread is acquired from daily volume-weighted average of bid and ask price. I 
 129 
classify the difference between the quoted spread and traded spread as 
asymmetric information risk. Like other variables, information risk is measured 
over the 6 months before the issue date. 
 
Underwriter price support related: 
 Offer size: If offer size is large, the number of shares traded in secondary market 
increases a lot after an issue date, and as a result, it becomes harder to push stock 
price in a specific direction. Thus, to support the stock’s price, underwriters must 
place a larger and more frequent limit orders. So order imbalance at or after the 
issue date will be more negative as the offer size becomes larger. This correlation 
has a sign that is opposite the prediction of the price pressure hypothesis. 
 Underwriter reputation: Cotter, Chen, and Kao (2004) and Lewellen (2006) find 
that underwriters with a better reputation provide stronger price supports. Thus, 
order imbalances are expected to be more negative as an underwriter’s reputation 
rises. Although underwriter reputation is also related to information asymmetry 
and uncertainty, we can differentiate two effects because information asymmetry 
and uncertainty would affect order imbalance before the issue date, while price 
support would affect order imbalance at / after the issue date. Also, the predicted 
correlation is opposite that of information asymmetry and uncertainty hypothesis. 
Lewellen (2006) reports that price supports after the issue date are uncorrelated 
with both the information asymmetry and uncertainty measures. Underwriter 
reputation should also be negatively correlated with order imbalances, because 
more reputable underwriters are able and willing to undertake stronger price 
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support activity, which leads to negative order imbalances. 
 Prevailing price level: As noted by Cotter, Chen, and Kao (2004), there is little 
need for price supports if market prices are above the offer prices. Prevailing 
price level can be estimated using daily average bid and ask prices weighted by 
trade volume. Stoll (2000) suggests that the mid-point of two prices is a fair 
estimate of daily prevailing price level. If one day’s prevailing price level is 
lower than offer price, the variable takes a value 1 and is 0 otherwise. This 
dummy variable is used to explain order imbalances at or after the issue date. 
 
Flipping related: 
 Underwriter reputation: Flipping hypothesis predicts that underwriter reputation 
is positively correlated with order imbalance. Better underwriters would reduce 
flipping activities by signaling a good performance of an SEO stock. Better 
underwriters can pressure other institutions to stay away from flipping, using 
their market power. 
 Prevailing price level: To the opposite of underwriter price support hypothesis, 
prevailing price level dummy will have a positive correlation with order 
imbalance. The variable receives value 1 when one day’s prevailing price level is 
lower than offer price. Flipping would almost vanish in this case, making order 
imbalance more positive. 
 
Market maker inventory management related: 
 Quote compared to price: Stoll (1978) shows that if market makers want to 
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reduce their inventory levels, they can promote buying pressure by placing 
quotes below prevailing price levels. To measure this effect, I compare bid and 
ask quotes with actual trading price. Each day, I subtract average price level from 
average bid-ask mid point, and this variable is a measure of inventory 
management. As the bid-ask midpoint falls below the price level, order 
imbalances become more positive. Thus, the correlation between the price level 
minus midpoint differences and order imbalances should be negative. This 
variable is used to explain order imbalances before the issue date. 
 Traded bid-ask spread: Inventory risk indicates the risk of market makers 
incurred by deviating from their optimal inventory level. If the risk is high, 
market makers would have a larger incentive to smooth their inventory 
movement around an SEO. Stoll (2000) shows that traded bid-ask spread – the 
difference between daily average bid and ask – reflects inventory risk and real 
frictions. Since this spread does not include an information asymmetry 
component, it is a cleaner measure of inventory risk. I use monthly average of 
daily traded spreads measured over the prior 6 months from the issue date. 
Higher traded spreads should make order imbalances more positive prior to the 
issue date. 
 
A firm’s market value is included in the regressions as a standard control variable. 
The market value is a monthly average measured over the 6 months prior to the issue date. 
I add a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when a stock is listed on Nasdaq and is 0 
otherwise. Masulis and Shivakumar (2002), Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), and Mola and 
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Loughran (2004) find that being listed on Nasdaq changes a stock’s behavior during an 
SEO. Table 4 summarizes the variables used in the regressions and their predicted effects 
on order imbalances. 
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Table 4 – Explanatory variables 
 
This table shows the summary of explanatory variables and their predicted correlated with order 
imbalance before/ at/ after an SEO issue date. 
 
Hypothesis Variable Before an issue date At an issue date 
After an issue 
date 
Selling incentives 
Offer size Negative Positive Positive 
Kyle’s Lambda Negative Positive Positive 
Uncertainty and 
information asymmetry 
Idiosyncratic risk Negative   
Return volatility Negative   
Underwriter reputation Positive   
Information risk Negative   
Underwriter price support 
Offer size  Negative Negative 
Underwriter reputation  Negative Negative 
Prevailing price dummy  Negative Negative 
Flipping 
Underwriter reputation  Positive Positive 
Prevailing price dummy  Positive Positive 
Inventory management 
Quote compared to 
price Negative   
Traded spread Positive   
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C. Regression results 
The basic approach I take is to estimate a linear equation with order imbalances on 
the left hand side. 
iitiOI εα +Χ⋅Β+=,                 (1) 
   where OIit is order imbalance of stock i, at t days from its issue date and X is 
matrix of explanatory and control variables 
 
I use OLS with heterskedasticity robust error structure. The error structure is further 
corrected for clustering by firm. I also add year dummies to control year fixed effect. 
Table 5 shows regression results. 
Table 5 shows that order imbalances before the issue date are mostly uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables. The regression results do not detect evidence consistent 
with the selling incentives or information asymmetry/ uncertainty hypotheses. Moreover, 
stock volatility is positively correlated with order imbalance 2 days before the issue date, 
which is directly opposite to the prediction of information asymmetry / uncertainty 
hypothesis. One implication is that typical negative stock return before an SEO issue date 
is not a result of SEO related selling activities. Consistent with inventory management 
hypothesis, quotes compared to prices are negatively correlated with order imbalances in 
the 3 days and 1 day prior to the issue date. The result supports the conclusion that a 
positive order imbalance before an issue date is generated by market maker inventory 
management. However, this type of inventory management has little effect on stock 
returns or underpricing, because market maker inventory management only moves quotes, 
rather than prices. 
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Table 5 –Determinants of order imbalance 
Model:  iitiOI εα +Χ⋅Β+=,                       (1) 
I use OLS with heteroskedasticity corrected errors. I account for clustering by firm in the error 
structure and add year dummies in the regression. P-values are in the parenthesis. The coefficients 
significant in 1% level are marked with small a, the coefficients significant in 5% level are 
marked with small b, and the coefficients significant in 10% level are marked with small c. 
 
Panel A: Order imbalance before an issue date 
Dependent Variable Order imbalance 4 days before 
Order imbalance 3 
days before 
Order imbalance 2 
days before 
Order imbalance 1 
day before 
Offer size 0.521 (0.25) 
0.196 
(0.68) 
0.141 
(0.83) 
-0.040 
(0.91) 
Kyle’s Lambda -0.121 (0.35) 
-0.047 
(0.74) 
-0.167 
(0.24) 
-0.335b 
(0.02) 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.399 (0.74) 
-1.685 
(0.21) 
1.633 
(0.30) 
2.496 
(0.22) 
Stock volatility 2.210 (0.74) 
22.461a 
(0.00) 
0.591 
(0.93) 
3.143 
(0.69) 
Information risk -20.778 (0.61) 
-48.737 
(0.29) 
6.494 
(0.92) 
-15.835 
(0.77) 
Underwriter 
reputation 
0.254 
(0.50) 
0.526 
(0.19) 
0.427 
(0.34) 
-0.117 
(0.78) 
Quote compared to 
price 
2.615 
(0.77) 
-0.028b 
(0.04) 
-3.692 
(0.36) 
-7.803b 
(0.05) 
Traded spread 0.286 (0.82) 
-0.536 
(0.78) 
1.401 
(0.34) 
-0.602 
(0.77) 
Log (Firm’s Market 
value) 
0.108 
(0.30) 
0.063 
(0.51) 
0.015 
(0.88) 
0.302a 
(0.01) 
Nasdaq dummy -0.795
a 
(0.00) 
-0.820a 
(0.00) 
-1.256a 
(0.00) 
-0.642b 
(0.03) 
Observations 1078 1076 1079 1079 
Adj. R-square 4.9% 5.7% 5.1% 8.1% 
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Panel B: Order imbalance at or after an issue date 
Dependent 
Variable 
Order imbalance 
at an issue date 
Order imbalance 
1 day after 
Order imbalance 
2 days after 
Order imbalance 
3 days after 
Order imbalance 
4 days after 
Offer size -8.450
c 
(0.07) 
-14.301a 
(0.01) 
-1.932a 
(0.01) 
0.750 
(0.51) 
-4.211 
(0.14) 
Kyle’s Lambda -0.270 (0.81) 
-0.212 
(0.84) 
0.039 
(0.92) 
-0.234 
(0.32) 
-0.017 
(0.95) 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
3.721 
(0.60) 
-0.075 
(0.99) 
3.768 
(0.20) 
-1.496 
(0.28) 
0.601 
(0.81) 
Stock volatility -101.593
c 
(0.07) 
6.124 
(0.91) 
-7.761 
(0.55) 
11.421 
(0.28) 
10.693 
(0.60) 
Information risk -630.549 (0.18) 
422.668 
(0.44) 
-0.430 
(0.99) 
-132.298 
(0.12) 
-82.260 
(0.56) 
Underwriter 
reputation 
2.966 
(0.41) 
-8.121a 
(0.00) 
-1.722c 
(0.05) 
-1.174c 
(0.08) 
0.062 
(0.96) 
Prevailing price 
dummy 
-5.802a 
(0.01) 
-6.999a 
(0.00) 
-1.431a 
(0.00) 
-0.965a 
(0.00) 
-0.654c 
(0.09) 
Traded spread 0.515 (0.97) 
-41.285c 
(0.06) 
-2.170 
(0.66) 
-2.588 
(0.53) 
0.754 
(0.85) 
Log (Firm’s 
Market value) 
0.497 
(0.47) 
2.115b 
(0.01) 
0.677a 
(0.00) 
0.381b 
(0.01) 
-0.036 
(0.84) 
Nasdaq dummy -0.492 (0.79) 
-2.670 
(0.24) 
-1.252b 
(0.02) 
-0.556 
(0.19) 
-1.285b 
(0.04) 
Observations 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
Adj. R-square 13.4% 10.8% 8.3% 5.7% 4.5% 
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Note that Nasdaq stocks consistently have a more negative order imbalance before an 
issue date. Correlation between Nasdaq listing and SEO underpricing is driven by larger 
selling pressures in the pre-SEO period. There is no clear explanation for why Nasdaq 
stocks have a greater frequency of negative order imbalances. The explanation for this 
issue result is a potentially interesting topic for future research. 
At the issue date, stock volatility is significantly and negatively correlated with order 
imbalance levels. The sign of coefficients indicate that investors just react at the equity 
issue date, rather than altering their trading patterns in anticipation of the event. 
Meanwhile, order imbalance at an issue date is negatively correlated with offer size and 
the prevailing price dummy for market price dropping below offer price. Such negative 
correlations can last for 2 to 3 days after the issue date. Further, underwriter reputation 
generates significant negative order imbalances after the issue date. This result is 
consistent with the price support hypothesis that underwriters are placing limit orders to 
buy stock to prevent the stock prices from dropping much relative to the offer prices. The 
degree of price support (negative order imbalance) increases in offer size and underwriter 
reputation. On the other hand, negative coefficient of underwriter reputation and 
prevailing price dummy is inconsistent with flipping hypothesis. Prevailing price has 
especially large effect on trading patterns: I find average order imbalance of -8.71 when 
average market price is below the offer price, while -2.29 for the other cases. 
Overall, I find trading patterns around an SEO issue date are mainly driven by market 
maker inventory management prior to SEO issue dates and underwriter price support 
following the issue dates. Inventory management has some effects on order imbalances 
before the issue date, while price support activity has a large impact on order imbalances 
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both at and after the issue date. Other characteristics of an SEO tend to have at most 
marginal correlations with the share trading patterns. 
 
V. Order Imbalance and SEO Underpricing 
This section studies relation between order imbalance and SEO underpricing. The 
purpose of the test is to see whether trading pressure itself can change the size of 
underpricing. The selling incentives and information asymmetry / uncertainty hypotheses 
predict order imbalances are negatively correlated with underpricing in the cross section. 
This prediction follows from the assumption that selling pressure and information 
asymmetry / uncertainty generate a negative order imbalance that pushes down the SEO 
offer price. On the other hand, the underwriter price support hypothesis predicts a 
positive correlation between order imbalances and underpricing across issuing firms. 
More negative order imbalance indicates that underwriters are undertaking stronger price 
support activities, and this activity will help prop up the stock price of an issuing firm. 
While SEO underpricing can be defined in several ways, a typical measure is the 
difference between offering price and the closing price on the SEO issue date. Altinkilic 
and Hansen (2006) express underpricing in the following equation: 
 
)log(
c
o
P
Pngunderprici =                        (2) 
where Po is offering price and Pc is the closing price of an issue date. 
Since underpricing measures price movement at the issue date, I test the correlation 
between order imbalances at the issue date and SEO underpricing. Corwin (2003) and 
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) document that variables like offer price, idiosyncratic 
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risk, stock volatility, underwriter reputation, firm size, and Nasdaq dummy are 
significantly correlated with underpricing. My previous regression on order imbalance 
contains those variables, and so I use these same control variables plus order imbalance 
as regressors. 
Because order imbalance is correlated with several characteristics of the SEO at an 
issue date, a regression between underpricing and order imbalance is subject to an 
endogeneity problem. I use a standard 2-stage-least-squares technique to overcome this 
problem. In the 1st stage, I estimate order imbalance at the issue date based on SEO 
characteristics. The 2nd stage regression is between the estimated order imbalances and 
underpricing. An important part of this estimation is selecting instrument variables in the 
1st stage. The instruments should have a high correlation with order imbalances and low 
correlations with SEO characteristics. 
According to Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004), order imbalance has a strong serial correlation. I test serial 
correlation between order imbalance a day before an issue date and order imbalance at an 
issue date. I find two variables are significantly and positively correlated (t-stat 3.11). 
The correlation is significant in 1% level even after controlling for heteroskedasticity in 
the error structure, clustering by firm, and year fixed effects. Meanwhile, as we see in 
Table 4, order imbalances before the issue date do not have significant correlations with 
SEO characteristics, except for Kyle’s lambda. Order imbalances a day before the issue 
date are likely to have a low correlation with SEO underpricing. Also, I show that order 
imbalances before the issue date is driven by market makers’ inventory management, 
which would not have much effect on stock prices. I verify that order imbalances on the 
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day before the SEO issue dates are not significantly correlated with underpricing (t-stat 
1.17). 
In the 1st stage equation, I estimate order imbalances on the issue date using the 
previous day’s order imbalance as an instrumental variable. The right hand side has all 
the explanatory and control variables used in the previous order imbalance regression. 
The equation is: 
iititi OIOI εβα +Χ⋅Β+⋅+= −1,,                 (3) 
 
I verify that the 1st stage regression model has reasonable explanatory power with an 
adjusted R-square of 13.1%. 2nd stage regression uses the estimated order imbalances 
from the 1st stage equation as additional regressors. 
iititi OIngunderprici εδα +Χ⋅Β+⋅+= ,,                 (4) 
 
Wooldridge (2002) shows that this method gives a consistent estimation if X, the 
matrix of regressors is identical in both regressions. So when altering the model 
specification, I use the same explanatory variable matrix X in both stages. Table 6 
contains the regression estimates for equation (4). 
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Table 6 –Order imbalance and underpricing 
 
Model: iititi OIOI εβα +Χ⋅Β+⋅+= −1,,                 (3) 
 
iititi OIngunderprici εδα +Χ⋅Β+⋅+= ,,          (4) 
 
 
Equation (4) uses OLS with heteroskedasticity corrected errors. I account for clustering by firm in 
the error structure and add year dummies in the regression. P-values are in the parenthesis. The 
coefficients significant in 1% level are marked with small a, the coefficients significant in 5% 
level are marked with small b, and the coefficients significant in 10% level are marked with small 
c. 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Order imbalance 1.192
b 
(0.03) 
1.356b 
(0.03) 
1.462b 
(0.01) 
1.315b 
(0.02) 
Offer size 0.004 (0.62) 
0.006 
(0.44)   
Kyle’s Lambda 2.881 (0.29) 
3.297 
(0.25)   
Idiosyncratic risk 2.063 (0.94) 
-2.623 
(0.93)   
Stock volatility 0.342
a 
(0.00) 
0.383a 
(0.00)  
0.385a 
(0.00) 
Information risk -0.609 (0.67) 
-0.517 
(0.73)  
 
 
Underwriter 
reputation 
-0.022a 
(0.00) 
-0.023a 
(0.00)  
-0.023a 
(0.00) 
Prevailing price 
dummy 
-0.035a 
(0.00)    
Traded spread -0.052 (0.22) 
-0.058 
(0.17)   
Log (Firm’s 
Market value) 
-2.112 
(0.22) 
-2.814c 
(0.12) 
-6.006b 
(0.02) 
-3.219 
(0.21) 
Nasdaq dummy 7.589 (0.22) 
8.405 
(0.17) 
11.238b 
(0.02) 
5.204 
(0.28) 
Observations 1080 1080 1096 1087 
Adj. R-square 13.3% 5.1% 3.5% 4.6% 
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Table 6 shows that order imbalance is positively correlated with SEO underpricing. 
The sign of the coefficient is consistent with the price support hypothesis. A stronger 
price support – more negative order imbalance – reduces underpricing. The correlation 
between order imbalance and underpricing is significant after controlling for standard 
determinants of underpricing. Thus, trading pressure alone can affect the degree of 
underpricing. While underpricing is a common measure of flotation cost, these results 
show that underwriters can temporarily move secondary market prices to measured 
flotation costs in terms of underpricing. Large investment banks or commercial banks in 
particular would have advantage due to their greater ability to move secondary market 
prices. An implication is that the underpricing measure can be manipulated if a financial 
institution has ability to move the stock price on the issue date.23
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Using order imbalance measure, I analyze buying and selling activities around an 
SEO issue date. I set five hypotheses on order imbalance around an issue date. First, 
selling incentives hypothesis assumes that traders mostly engage in selling activities 
before an issue date. There is arbitrage opportunity of short selling before an issue date 
and covering it afterwards. Supply shock from primary market can create a temporary 
price drop, and traders may also want to use the opportunity. Second, uncertainty and 
information asymmetry hypothesis states that uncertainty and information asymmetry of 
an SEO will keep buyers from trading before an issue date. A result is more sell side 
trading before an issue date. Third, underwriter price support hypothesis predicts negative 
                                                 
23 Similarly, Lewellen (2006) finds underwriters with brokerage service engage more in price support activity of an 
IPO. His result supports the argument that ability to move secondary market is important. 
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order imbalance after an issue date, because underwriters are placing limit orders at bid 
side to support stock price. Fourth, flipping hypothesis tells that institutional investors 
acquire SEO shares in primary market and sell them in secondary market. The activity 
can give institutional investors a short term profit and generate a selling pressure after an 
issue date. Fifth, market maker inventory management hypothesis argues that market 
makers reduce their inventory level before an issue date by lowering their quotes 
compares to price level. Due to this trading, order imbalances before an issue date 
become positive. 
I track order imbalance patterns around an SEO issue date and find that order 
imbalance is positive before an SEO and large negative afterwards. The pattern of order 
imbalance is consistent with price support hypothesis, flipping hypothesis, and inventory 
management hypothesis. Meanwhile, selling incentives hypothesis and uncertainty / 
information asymmetry hypothesis have little explanatory power for trading patterns. A 
factor analysis on order imbalance gives evidence consistent with inventory management 
hypothesis and price support hypothesis. A positive order imbalance before an issue date 
is generated by placing quotes lower than price level. After an SEO issue date, selling 
pressure is increasing in offer size, underwriter reputation, and when current market price 
drops lower than offer price. 
Using an endogeneity controlled regression, I find that price support activity can 
affect the degree of SEO underpricing. Stocks that received more price support have less 
underpricing, even after controlling for other known factors of underpricing. 
This paper makes two contributes to the literature. First, this paper identifies the main 
factors that determine stock trading pattern around an SEO. Trading activity is mostly 
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affected by artificial supply and demand in secondary market, such as price support or 
inventory management. I find no evidence that short selling activity or supply shock from 
primary market changes overall trading pattern of secondary market. My result shows 
that trading activity around an SEO issue date is not quite as the same as stock return 
movement. Second, this paper shows that the degree of underpricing can be manipulated 
by price support activity. While underpricing is a common measure of equity flotation 
cost, I find a short term trading activity can affect the size of underpricing. This result 
raises a question whether underpricing measure well represents equity flotation cost. 
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Appendix – Construction of order imbalance data 
 
1. Criteria for stock selection are: 
• Data source comes from Trade and Quote (TAQ) data. 
• Data period is from January 1996 to December 2004. 
• I exclude Certificates, ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, units, Americus Trust 
components, closed-end funds, preferred stocks and REITs from the dataset. 
• I delete the stock is from the sample year if the price at any month-end during the 
year was greater than $999. 
• I eliminate non-synchronous trading issue by marking stock return as missing if 
there was no trade on today or previous day. 
 
2. When constructing order imbalance variable, I only use quotes and trades such that:  
• Quotes and trades are in regular market trading times (from 9:30 to 16:00) 
• There is no special settlement conditions 
• All bid-ask spreads are positive 
 
3. Method to calculate order imbalance is (Lee and Ready (1991) method): 
• A trade is buyer (seller) initiated if it is closer to the ask (bid) of the prevailing 
quote.  
• Prevailing quote should be at least 5 seconds old. 
If the trade is at the midpoint of the quote, the trade is buyer (seller) initiated if prior 
stock price change was positive (negative). 
 
 
 
